Short Essay on the Validity of Knowledge

Whenever there are sufficient conditions for the generation of a particular kind of knowledge (and, therefore, no grounds for doubt or disbelief are known), there arises at once that kind of knowledge containing an element of belief in the object known.

For example, when our normal eyes light on an object conveniently situated in broad daylight, there is visual perception; when we hear someone speak a meaningful sentence, we have knowledge from his testimony.

When there are sufficient premises, inference takes place. That we act on such knowledge in everyday life as soon as we have it, without any attempt to test its validity by argument, shows that we believe in it as soon as it arises.

And the fact that such knowledge leads to successful activity and not to any contradiction shows further that such knowledge is valid.

When, however, the conditions required for the generation of that kind of knowledge are known to be defective or wanting if, for example, the eyes are jaundiced, light is insufficient, premises are doubtful or words are meaningless, etc. no such knowledge arises; neither.

Therefore, does any belief arise, so long as the grounds for doubt and disbelief do not disappear? From these facts two conclusions are drawn by the Mimamsa. (a) The validity of knowledge arises from the very conditions that give rise to that knowledge, and not from any extra conditions (pyromania) (b) The validity of knowledge is also believed known as soon as the knowledge arises; belief does not await the verification of the knowledge by some other knowledge.

Truth is self-evident, according to this view. Whenever any knowledge arises, it carries with it an assurance about its own truth. Sometimes knowledge may point out that this assurance is misleading, or that the conditions of the knowledge are defective.

In such a case we infer from the existence of defective conditions, the falsity of the knowledge. Thus the falsity of knowledge is ascertained by inference, while truth is self- evident.

To put the whole position simply, belief is normal, disbelief is an exception. As perception, inference and any other knowledge arise, we implicitly accept them; believe in them without further argument, unless we are compelled by some contrary evidence to doubt their validity or to infer their falsity. On this unsuspecting faith in our knowledge our life runs smoothly.

Against the Nyaya theory that validity is generated by some extra conditions (such as soundness of organs), over and above the ordinary conditions which generate the knowledge.

The Mimamsa points out that those extra conditions really form a part of the normal conditions of that knowledge; without them there would be no belief and, therefore, no knowledge at all.

Against the Nyaya view that the validity of every knowledge is ascertained by inference, the Mimamsa points out that this would lead us to an infinite regress and activity would be impossible.

“Any knowledge, say, a perception, before being acted upon where to be verified by an inference, then by the same Nyaya rule that inference also would have to be verified by another inference so on; and there would have been no end to this process of verification and life would have been impossible.

As soon as we perceive a tiger we run away, as soon as we infer the approach of a car from its horn we guard our steps; if we are to wait fo_r verifying our knowledge with the never-ending series of inferences we should have to wait for ever before we could act on any knowledge.

It is true that when there is any positive cause for doubt regarding any knowledge, we take the help of verifying inference; but that only does the negative work of removing the obstacles that stand in the way of knowledge.

After the obstacles are removed, knowledge arises out of its own usual conditions, if present there, and along with it arise its validity and belief in its validity. If that verifying inference is unable to remove doubt, then that knowledge does not arise at all.

Belief in authority, personal or impersonal, Vedic or non- Vedic, arises in a similar way. On hearing a meaningful sentence we at once believe in what it says unless there are reasons for doubt or disbelief.

Therefore, authority of the eternal, impersonal Vedas also stands on its own legs. Its validity is self-evident and not dependent on inference. Arguments are necessary for the negative work of clearing the mind of doubts.

This being done, the Vedas themselves reveal their own meanings, and belief invariably accompanies the understanding of these meanings.

To secure this belief all that the Mimamsa does is to refute the possible grounds on which the infallibility of the Vedas may be doubted, and thus to prepare the mind for the immediate acceptance of what is known from the Vedas.