Short Essay on the Nature and Kinds of Knowledge

Consciousness is the inseparable essence of every soul according to the Jainas; it is not, as the Carvakas hold, a mere accidental property, arising only under some conditions.

Moreover, consciousness is conceived like the sun’s light, capable of manifesting itself and everything else unless some obstruction prevents it from reaching its object. Had there been no obstacles, the soul would have been omniscient.

Omniscience is a potentiality inherent in every soul. As it is, however, we find that ordinary souls are all more or less ignorant, their knowledge is limited.

The Jainas hold that this limitation is due to the obstacles created by different karmas which obstruct in different degrees the natural consciousness of the soul and thus deprive it of its omniscience.

The body, the senses and the mind (manas) are all consdtuted by karmas and the soul’s power is limited by them.

Like other thinkers, the Jainas admit the twofold classification of knowledge into immediate and mediate (aparoksa and paroksa). But they point out that what is ordinarily regarded as immediate knowledge is only relatively immediate.

Perception of external or internal objects through the senses (indriya) or mind (manas) is immediate as compared with inference.

Still such knowledge cannot be said to be absolutely immediate, because even here the soul knows through the medium of something else, the senses or manas.

In addition to such ordinary or empirical (vyavaharika) immediate knowledge, there is also a really or absolutely (Paramarthika) immediate knowledge, which a soul attains, by removing its karma obstacles.

In such knowledge the soul’s consciousness becomes immediately related to objects, without the medium of senses, etc., simply by the removal of the karmas that prevented it from reaching those objects.

Three different kinds of such really immediate knowledge are distinguished. When a person has partially destroyed and allayed the influences of karmas, he acquires the power of knowing objects which have forms, but are too distant or minute or obscure to be observed by the senses or manas.

Such immediate knowledge by the unaided soul is, however, limited as its objects are limited and therefore, it is called aradhijnana (limited knowledge).

Again, when a person has overcome hatred, jealousy etc. (which create obstacles that stand in the way of knowing other minds).

He can have direct access to the present and lack of knowledge are completely removed from the soul there arises in it absolute knowledge or omniscience. This is called kevalajnana. Only the liberated souls have such knowledge.

Tiiese are, then, the three kinds of extraordinary or extra­sensory perceptions which are immediate par excellence. But in addition to these, there are the two kinds of ordinary knowledge possessed by an average person.

These are called mati and sruta. There are differences of opinion among Jaina writers regarding the exact meanings of these terms. But ordinarily mati is taken to mean any kind of knowledge which we can obtain through the senses or thtough manas.

Thus understood, mati includes ordinary immediate knowledge (or internal and external perception), memory recognition and inference. Sruta is knowledge obtained from authority.

The Jainas give an account of the process by which ordinary perception takes place and is retained.At first there is only a distinct sensation, say of a sound. It is not yet known what it means.

This primary state of consciousness is called avagraha (i.e., grasping the object). Then arises the query: ‘What is this sounc?’ This questioning state of the mind is called Iha (i.e., query).

Then comes a definite judgment like ‘This is the sound of a car.’ This is called avaya (removal of doubt). Then what is ascertained is retained in the mind. This retention is called dharana (i.e., holding in the mind).

Sruta, the second kind of ordinary knowledge is mostly interpreted as knowledge obtained from what is heard from others. This includes all kinds of knowledge derived from spoken _or written authority.

As the understanding of any authority is dependent on the perception of sounds or written letters, sruta is said to be preceded by mad.

It is pointed out, further, that these two kinds of ordinary knowledge (namely, mati and sruta), as well as the lowest kind of immediate extraordinary knowledge (namely, avadhi), are not absolutely free from chances of error.

But the two higher kinds of immediate extra-sensory knowledge (manahparyaya and kevala) are never liable to any error.

For ordinary purposes, the Jainas accept the general view that there are three pramanas, namely, perception, inference and testimony (i.e., authority).