Here is your short Essay on Upamana or Comparison

Upamana is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by the. It is the source of our knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named or between a word and its denotation (sanjnasanjnisambandha).

We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description and then.

On the basis of the given description, apply the word to some object or objects which fit in with that description, although we might not have seen them before.

For example, a man, who does not know what a gavaya or wild cow is, may be told by a forester that it is an animal like the cow.

If subsequently he happens to meet with such an animal in the forest and knows or recognizes it as a gavaya, then his knowledge will be due to upamana or comparison.

A boy who does not know what a jackdaw is, may be told by you that it is like a crow, but of bigger size and glazy black colour.

When next he sees a jackdaw and says, ‘this must be a jackdaw,’ we know that he has learnt the denotation of the word. To take another example from Dr. L.S. Stebbing, suppose you do not know what ‘saxophone’ means.

You may be told by a musician: ‘A saxophone is a musical instrument something like an Ushaped trumpet.’

If, on subsequently seeing a saxophone, you are able to give its name, it will be clear that you understand what ‘saxophone’ means. Now, upamana is just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or the relation between names and the objects denoted by them.

The grounds of our knowledge in upamana are a given description of the objects to be known and a perception of their similarity, etc. to the familiar objects mentioned in the description.

A man recognizes a gavaya as such just when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description, ‘the gavaya is an animal resembling the cow.

In the other systems of Indian philosophy the Carvakas contend that upamana is not a pramana at all, since it cannot give us any true knowledge about the denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyayikas.

The Buddhist logicians recognise upamana as a form of valid knowledge, but they reduce it to perception and testimony, so that we do not require a separate source of knowledge like upamana.

So also, the Vaisesika and the Sarikhya system explain upamana as a form of inference, and therefore, neither a distinct type of knowledge nor an independent way of knowing. The Jaina reduces upamana to pratyabhijna or recognition.

While recognising upamana as a separate source of knowledge, the Mimamsakas and the Vedantins explain it in a different way which will be considered under the Mimamsa.