The Portuguese connection with Malabar till now showed no sign of a consistent political or commercial policy. Their history was a series of unconnected episodes, all marked by the stain of savage cruelty and blood. But one constant factor was always present in their inconsistent policy that was their hate for Moors for their religion and trade. If the Zamorin had agreed to drive out Muslim traders from Calicut probably the Portuguese would have remained there as traders.

As K.M. Panikkar pointed out, “In the first round of the fight, the Portuguese were not able to establish themselves as a Kerala power. But it became clear that there was no possibility of driving them away from the Indian coast.

They had gained the right to trade; and by the relations entered into with Cochin, Quilon and Cannanore, they had secured considerable commercial interests. Neither on sea, nor on land was they the masters; but the Moors, the Zamorin and other Indian powers recognized after 4 years of fight, that a new and incalculable factor had been added to the already complicated politics of India.”

In 1505, the Portuguese decided upon a new policy with regard to their relation with South Indian princes. The early predatory trade policy still continued but the interval between one fleet and the next was closed by appointing a viceroy for three years. Francisco d’Almedia came to the Malabar Coast in 1505 and tried to establish Portuguese supremacy in the Arabian ocean.

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He followed a hostile policy towards the Zamorin, and Muslim traders were harassed and their vessels were continuously preyed upon by his fleet. The unwarranted sinking of a Moorish ship antagonized the Kolattiri also who was well disposed towards the Portuguese.

Till 1508 Portuguese dealings were restricted to Hindu kings of South India, their northernmost point being Anjadiva. In that year Almedia thought of moving farther north by attacking Muslim powers on the Gujarat coast. Muslim princes of South and West coast, and the Zamorin negotiated with the Sultan of Egypt who agreed to send a fleet.

Their combined naval forces courted junction off Chaul to meet the common enemy. In the naval engagement that ensued Portuguese suffered severe reverse and Almeda’s son, the Portu­guese Commander, was killed. But the Viceroy avenged his son’s death by inflicting a terrible defeat on the Muslim fleets in 1509.

Almeda was interested in setting up factories in South India and establishing commercial relations on a firm footing with the Hindu princes, as a counterpoise to Arab supremacy in Eastern trade. Direct rule over any territorial possession was not contemplated by him, a strong fleet, not a fort around the factory, he contended, would look after the trade interests of Portugal.

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For a puny state like Portugal with a small population, an Eastern territorial acquisition would be a ruinous luxury. “The greater number of fortresses you hold” wrote Almedia to King Manoel, “the weaker will be your power. Let all our forces be at sea; because if we should not be powerful at sea (which the Lord forbid) everything will at once be against us. Let it be known for certain that as long as you may be powerful at sea you will hold India as yours, and if you do not possess this power, little will avail you a fortress on shore.”