Essay of the Schools of Bauddha Philosophy

It has been found again and again in the history of human thought that every reasoned attempt to avoid philosophy lands a thinker into a new kind of philosophy.

In spite of Buddha’s aversion to theoretical speculation, he never wanted to accept, not did he encourage his followers to accept, any course of action without reasoning and criticism.

He was extremely rational and contempladve and wanted to penetrate into the very roots of human existence, and tried to supply the full justification of the ethical principles he followed and taught It was no wonder, therefore, that he himself incidentally laid down the foundation of a philosophical system.

His philosophy, partly expressed and partly implicit, may be called posidvism in so far as he taught that our thoughts should be confined to this world and to the improvement of our existence here.

It may be called phenomenalism insofar as he taught that we were sure only of the phenomena we experienced. It is, therefore, a kind of empiricism in method because experience, according to him, was the source of knowledge.

These different aspects of his philosophy came to be developed by his followers along different lines as they were required to justify Buddha’s teaching, to defend it from the severe criticism it had to face in India and outside, and to convert other thinkers to their faith.

Buddha’s reluctance to discuss the ten metaphysical questions concerning things beyond our experience and his silence about them came to be interpreted by his followers in different lights.

Some took this atdtude as only the sign of a throughgoing empiricism which must frankly admit the inability of the mind to decide non-empirical questions.

According to this explanation, Buddha’s attitude would be regarded as scepticism. Some other followers, mostly the Mahayanists, interpreted Buddha’s view neither as a denial of reality beyond objects of ordinary experience, nor as a denial of any means of knowing the non-empirical reality.

But only as signifying the indescribability of that transcendental experience and reality. The justification of this last interpretation can be obtained from some facts of Buddha’s life and teachings.

Ordinary empiricists believe that our sense-experience is the only basis of all our knowledge; they do not admit the possibility of any non-sensuous experience.

Buddha, however, taught the possibility of man’s attaining in nirvana an experience or consciousness which was not generated by the activity of the sense.

The supreme value and importance that he attached to this non-empirical consciousness, justify his followers in supposing that he regarded this as the supreme reality, as well.

The fact that very often Buddha used to say that he had a profound experience of things ‘far beyond’, which is ‘comprehended only by the wise’ and ‘not grasped by mere logic’, may be taken to mean that his non-empirical experience can neither be logically proved with arguments nor be expressed in empirical ideas and language.

These grounds lead some followers, as we shall see, to raise a philosophy of mysticism and transcendentalism out of the very silence of Buddha. The nemesis of neglected metaphysics thus overtakes Buddhism soon after the founder’s passing away.

Buddhism, though primarily an ethical-religious movement, thus came to give birth to about thirty schools, not counting the minor one.

“And some of these get into the deep waters of metaphysical speculation, heedless of the founder’s warning. Of these many schools we shall first notice the four distinguished in India by Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers.

In this account, (a) some Bauddha philosophers are nihilists (sunya-vadl or Madhyamika), (b) others are subjective idealists (Vijrianavadi or Yogacara, (c) others still are representationists or critical realists (Bahyanumeya-vadI or Sautrantika), and (d) the rest are direct realists (Bahyapratyaksa-vadI) or Vaibhasika).

The first two of the above four schools come under Mahayana and the last two under Hinayana. It should be noted, however, that under both Mahayana and Hinayana there are many other schools.

The fourfold classification of Bauddha philosophy is based ^upon two chief questions, one metaphysical or concerning reality and the other epistemological or concerning the knowing of reality.

To the metaphysical question ‘Is there at all any reality, mental or non-mental?’ three different replies are given: (a) the Madhhyamikas hold” that there is no reality, mental or non- mental; that all is void (sunya). Therefore, they have been known as the nihilists (sunya-vadins). (b) The Yogacaras hold that only the mental is real, the non-mental or the material world is all void of reality. They are, therefore, called subjective idealists (vijnanavadins). (e) Still another class of Bauddhas holds that both the mental and the non-mental are real.

They may, therefore, be called realists. Sometimes they are styled Sarvastivadins (i.e. those who hold the reality of all things), though this term is often used in a narrower sense by some Buddhist writers.

But when the further epistemological quesdon is asked: ‘How is external reality known to exist?’ these third groups of thinkers, who believe in external reality, give two different answers.

Some of them, called Sautrantikas, hold that external objects are not perceived but known by inference. Others, known as Vaibhasikas, hold that the external world is directly perceived.

Thus we have the four schools, representing the four important standpoints. This classification has much philosophical importance, even in the light of contemporary Western thought, where we find some of these different views advocated with great force. Let us consider these four schools.