The Danish trade in Travancore was both covert and overt. In March 1772 Peter Elwin Wrench, the English Chief of Anjengo, informed the Board of the intelligence report on the Danish supply of iron and copper to Travancore for which they got pepper in return. They were also very active at Kovalam, about 15 kms south of Trivandrum, intending to ship off paper and coir.

In spite of their amicable relations with Travancore, the Danes supplied arms to the Nawab of Arcot for his adventure on Travancore. According to Ole Feldback, the Danish historian, “in connection with the attack by the Nawab of Arcot, Muhammad Ali, on Travancore in 1773, the Company succeeded in getting a very large order for guns, muskets, and ammunition, on condition that the transaction was kept secret from the English East India Company”.

Providing the Nawab with weapons by no means prevented the Danes from selling them to his enemy, Haider Ali of Mysore (and curiously enough Travancore also got a share of the swop) who were in battle array. It is said that “The deliveries to Haider Ali were made through the Company’s station at Calicut on the Malabar coast, and the corresponding deliveries to the King of Travancore through the Danish station on the same coast, at Colachel.”

While the English and the Dutch companies depended on annual deliveries for which they had contracted with Travancore, the Danes had to wait patiently for the opportune moment and the goodwill of the sovereign. To a very large extent the Danish fortune in India depended upon the charitable disposition of the Travancore sovereigns. The absence of military power and naval strength incapacitated them to vie with the English and the Dutch, the impossibility of entering into contract with Travancore narrowed their trade prospects.

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The English Chief of Anjengo noted in March 1773 of the presence of a Danish ship at Kottar for loading pepper from the locality. He protested to the King and made it clear that it was “highly disagreeable to hear such news whilst the Honourable English Company continues in your Kingdom.” The Chief’s protest was spurned on the ground that this was surplus pepper and Travancore was at liberty to sell the same to whomsoever she liked. This was followed by a large supply of war materials by the Danes in exchange for pepper. In 1780, James Morley, the English Chief remonstrated against the commercial transactions of the Danes at Vizhinjam.

Travancore, like the Danes, took an opportunistic stand, and never bothered about a lasting friendship. As the Danish friendship for Travancore was chiefly motivated by trade interests whom they sought to advance through shifty and furtive measures, Travancore’s was equally flexible and secretive with a view to promote her political and fiscal interests.

The menace from Tipu Sultan of Mysore made Travancore more dependent on the English than on any other foreign power, and hence there was a sudden drop in the quantum of cordiality and pepper to the Danes. Still the English were sceptical of Travancore, for as a tactical move the Danes had raised the price of pepper to lure the king.

By about 1795 the Danes were very active in the new port at Alleppey where one Casper Tope was in charge of the whole transactions. Hutchinson, the Factor at Anjengo, complained against this to Raja Kesava Das, the Prime Minister of Travancore, who, in turn, denied the allegation of pepper deal with the Danes at Alleppey. Unmindful of criticisms that centre on his presence, Tope persisted and was determined to safeguard his Company’s interest.

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The French presence in Travancore also had been sharply criticised by the English and they were prompt to take positive steps to thwart French attempts to secure commercial settlement in the land. But in the case of the Danes they seem to have had a sodden tenderness; whenever they got intelligence report on the Danish presence in Travancore, they would only record a protest and seldom moved beyond it. The French had considerable military power but the Danes lacked it.

Therefore it was easier for the English to contain the Danes, if they genuinely wanted it. Feedback alleged: “The Council at Tranquebar had private friendly relations with the English Resident at Tellicherry, Rawson Hard Boddam, later Governor of Bombay (Mumbai) who was interested in remitting his fortune to Europe by means of Danish Company’s bills of exchange.”

With such men at the helm of affairs it was impossible for the English Company to keep out the Danes from the commercial circle of Travancore. Except on one or two occasions when they took some steps to prevent the delivery of pepper, the English actually winked at the Danish trade.

The King of Travancore was the biggest customer of Danish goods. Except for their muskets which proved to be of inferior quality at later times, the king had no complaints about the Danish supply of different articles,. In 1795 Tope had a spectacular gain which was a record in the trade annals of the Danes in Travancore. By making a loan to the king of Travancore he succeeded in getting a contract for the delivery of 1500 candies of (pepper) 500 Dutch pounds each, and in getting permission to have cloths woven for the Company at Colachel.

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However, it is not known whether this contract was ever executed. The Treaty of 1795 between Travancore and the English was an obstacle in the path of fulfilling the contract. The sixth article of the treaty made it clear that no European could remain in the country without the prior consent and knowledge of the English. It was this provision that did considerable damage to the Danish trade in Travancore.

The last quarter of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries provided the Danish Company with its best returns. The Danes made the best use of their position as neutral carriers. They proved experts in smuggling trade, their ships engaged in this pursuit, though flying Danish flag, being often largely manned by Englishmen. It is said that most of these vessels were not only British-manned, but built, owned and insured in England.

The paradox of the existing rivalry and clandestine cooperation between the British and the Danish Companies forms a significant characteristic of the European trade enterprise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in India. Smuggling had become an important aspect of the commercial activity of Europeans here.

The Danish Company became increasingly dependent upon transactions with officers of the English Company for its survival. The clandestine deal between the Danes and the English officers in India is graphically explained by John C.F. Gray in his book Tranquebar: A Guide to the Coins of Danish India. He says:

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“In fact, in the lean years between the end of the American War and the outbreak of the Anglo-French revolutionary war, it (the Danish Company) might well have gone bankrupt but for this crutch. To understand the nature of this commerce, it must be recalled that the (English) East India Company, by paying outrageously low salaries to work in what was then a ‘White man’s grave’ (where the life expectancy of an EIC official was certainly a lot less than ten years), attracted a type of adventurer who was prepared to face both risk and discomfort in the hope of making a rapid fortune for himself and of retiring to England while his luck still held.

To attain his end, he was prepared to outdo the corrupt test of practices already endemic to India. He would trade on his own account in defiance both of the company’s monopoly (by charter) and of any sense of loyalty which he might have been expected to have towards his employers. He would probably divert company merchandise after falsifying the records, and might well buy at exorbitant prices on company account on condition that the supplier sell low to him privately by means such as these large personal fortunes were indeed made.

But two conditions were essential; in the case of commodities, shipping space outside the company monopoly had to be found for them to be transported either on a lucrative ‘country’ voyage or to Europe, and finally the private profits accrued in India had to be secretly remitted to England, as the accumulated capital could not be legally accounted for. Both these activities became major activities of the DAC (Dansk Asiatisk Campaign).

Their ships carried private cargo on personal accounts, and their connections contrived a flourishing business in bills of exchange drawn on financial houses not only in Copenhagen, but in Amsterdam and Ostend and even in London-firms which were able and willing to cover up potentially embarrassing records. Private Danish traders and ship owners shared in this lucrative covert trade.

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Eventually the British administrators, who were of course fully aware of what was going on, although unable to prevent it, found themselves in such need of additional capital to meet growing economic commitments that they were obliged to complete for these private funds, which they aimed to retain longer in India by the offer of high rates of interest and presumably no questions asked.

As an added inducement they even offered the eventual redemption of their bonds in London. By so doing, the English company was in fact ‘winking at’ the malpractices which they were unable to control. From this point on, the clandestine trade was no longer a major source of income to the Danes.”

Even though the British returned all their captured factories to the Danes, they were not in a position to carry on trade. The tottered company held on for some years, doing a little regular and a bit more irregular trade, and finally disappeared from the scene in 1843.

But to its credit the Danish Company could claim a longer life than “the greatest commercial organization which the world has ever seen-the Dutch East India Company, which had gone bankrupt as far back as 1798.” In 1845 the English East India Company purchased Tranquebar, together with Frederiksnagore from the crown for 12Vi lakhs of rupees.