Short essay on external relations of india

Sino-Indian Border Dispute

India shares a common border of 4,225 kilometers with China separating China from the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Arunachal Pradesh.

This boundary is the product of Manchu policy, Chinese Republican policy and the British policy. Difficult to democrat on the ground because of rugged terrain and harsh environment, the boundary was delimited, though imprecisely on the maps between India (Brit­ish) and Tibet (independent) and remained a peace­ful boundary till the mid of the 20th century. Since the independence of India on August 15, 1947, and the Communist takeover of China on October 1, 1949, a goodwill gesture developed between these two countries and in 1954 a general agreement containing the principle Panch Sheet (mutual re­spect for each others territorial integrity and sover­eignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-inter- ferrous in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence) was an­nounced.

With the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibetan Trade and Pilgrimage of April, 1954, India gave up the extraterritorial rights on Tibet, exercised by the British Raj on the basis of the secret Anglo-Tibetan Trade Agreement of July, 1914. India formally rec­ognized the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and, as a consequence for the first time in several centuries Tibet came under the direct control of a strong military power with an active forward policy. Thus the geo-strategic value of the entire Himalayan fron­tier was drastically changed.

The buffer qualities of Tibet became inoperative and a razor-thin boundary was established. Thus India had to face a powerful Communist army across its boundary rather than a wide frontier zone that existed for centuries. The Chinese leaders took advantage of their superior military strength, vast population and Communistic administrative machinery to degrade Indian pres­tige, teach it a lesson for its interference in Tibetan affairs, retard the Indian economic progress, and promote nationalistic feeling in the country to vas­salage all those territories which once formed part of the so called Chinese empire.

The Sino-Indian border may conveniently be divided into three sectors: (i) the Western sector, (ii) the Middle sector, and (iii) the Eastern sector.

(1) The Western Sector

The boundary in the western sector between Jammu and Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet is about 1,770 kilometers in length. The frontier between Sinkiang and the Pakistan-occupied portion of Kash­mir (Azad Kashmir) is 480 km long and involves a disputed area of about 13,000 to 15,500 square kilometers.

The rest of this border is between Ladakh and Tibet. In the western sector, the boundary runs along the Mustagh Range and the Aghil Range, across the Karakoram Pass via the Qara Tagh Pass; and along the main Kuen Lun ranges to a point east of longitude 80° E and 40 km north of Hajit Langer.

This boundary is an obvious physical boundary between the Gilgit area and Sinkiang following the main Karakoram watershed dividing the streams flowing into the Indus basin from those flowing into the Tarim basin (Lamb, 1968, p. 132). Farther south­east the boundary runs along the watershed across Lanak La, Kone La and Kepsang La, then follows the Chemesang River across Pangyong Lake and the Kailash Range.

Here the boundary constitutes the watershed between the Indus system in India and the Khotan system in China. In this area China claims the Aksai Chin district, the Changmo valley, Pangong Tso, and the Spanggar Tso area of north-east Ladakh, as well as a strip of about 5,000 sq. km. down the entire length of eastern Ladakh (Bains, 1962, p. 139).

The western sector boundary is the product of the British policy towards the state of Jammu and Kashmir. These boundaries were defined by the treaties of 1665 and 1684 (Ladakh-Tibet agree­ments) and were confirmed by the 1842 Dogra- Ladakh agreement among Kashmir, Tibet and China.

The authoritative international commission of ju­rists concluded that the treaty was a tripartite treaty to which the Raja of Jammu, the Government of China and the Government of Tibet were signatories (White Paper II, 1959, pp. 52-57). The boundary was again reaffirmed in an agreement between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842).

This agreement stated that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet would remain the same as before. But China contended that the 1842 treaty did not bind it because: (a) China had not sent a representative to participate in the negotia­tions concerning the conclusion of the 1842 treaty, nor had she ratified it, (b) the treaty in any case did not define or locate the Ladakh-Tibet boundary, and (c) Sinkiang’s consent to the treaty was obtained. None of the allegations is valid.

Since 1954, the Chinese have repeatedly in­truded deeper and deeper into the western sector. By November 7, 1959, the date of the renewed Chinese aggression, the line of actual control was not a line but a series of positions occupied by the Chinese forces. By 1962 the Chinese had penetrated far deeper and the Chinese occupation line now runs from 16 to 240 km west of the traditional line. China is in actual possession of about 54,000 sq. km of the Indian Territory of which nearly 38,000 sq. km lie in the Ladakh area alone.

(2) The Middle Sector

The boundary in the middle sector runs along the watershed from Ladakh to Nepal. It is 625 km long and adjoins the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal. The traditional frontier of Himachal Pradesh follows the water parting between the Spiti and the Para Chu rivers and then continues along the watershed between the eastern and western tributar­ies of the Satluj. The Uttaranchal boundary lies on the water parting between the Satluj and the Kali, the Alaknanda and the Bhagirathi (Jadhanga). The bound­ary crosses the Satluj near the Shipki La (pass) on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border.

From there it runs along the watershed passes of Mana, Niti, Kungri- Bingri, Dharma, and Lipu Lekh, finally joining the triple point junction of China, Nepal and India. The Chinese claim nearly 2,000 sq. km in this area, particularly in the Ari district of Tibet, Bara Hoto (which the Chinese cal Wu je), Nilang-Jadhang, Sang, Tsunghsha Malla, Lapthal, Chuve, Chuje, Shipki Pass, and Pussing-Sumdo.

This segment of the boundary was approved by the Tibetan and British governments under the 1890 and 1919 treaties (Report of the Indian Offi­cials on the Boundary Question, 1961, p. 253). Local officials of the Garhwal district had been exercising administrative jurisdiction over this area for centu­ries. The Chinese have asserted that Bara Hoti (Wu je, an area of about 4 sq. km) and Nilang-Jadhang belong to Tibet, since Tibet has been exercising jurisdiction over them. They also maintain that the Sang and Tsungsha areas, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, were gradually invaded and occu­pied by the British some 30 or 40 years and hence must be returned to China.

(3) The Eastern Sector

The boundary in the eastern sector is 1,140 km long and runs from the eastern limit of Bhutan to a point near the Talu Pass at the trijunction of India, Tibet and Myanmar. This line is called the Mc Mahon Line after Henry Mc Mahon, a British repre­sentative who signed the 1913-14 Shimla Conven­tion.

The northern boundary of Sikkim was defined by the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890. The bound­ary was established along the Himalayan crest of the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, except where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri, and Kemang rivers break through that watershed.

The only variance from the watershed principle is near Miayetun and the two Tibetan pilgrim places of Tstokaro and Tsari Sarpa. In the eastern sector China claims about 94,700 sq. km of the Indian Territory, occupying 19,000 sq. km, including the Kameng, Subansiri and Siang frontier divisions and three-fourths of the Lohit Division of Arunachal Pradesh. China considers the Mc Mahon Line illegal and unacceptable claiming that Tibet had no right to sign the 1914 Convention held in Shimla which delineated the Mc Mahon line on the map. India challenges such a position, main­taining that Tibet was independent and in fact con­cluded several independent treaties which were con­sidered valid by all parties, and were in operation for decades.

The Chinese governments never formally questioned the validity of the agreement between India and Tibet until 1959. The Chinese expanded their military activities of August, 1959, by launch­ing a massive attack on India in late 1962. On October 20, 1962, China occupied the Thangla Ridge, Dhole, Tse Dong, Twang, Bomdila, Walong, Longju and Sela outposts in the Arunachal Pradesh area. The Colombo proposal of December, 1962, entitled In­dia and China to move their forces up to the Mc Mahon Line except in the Thangla and Longju areas, which were subject to negotiations.

The China war taught India many lesson the myth that the Himalaya was an effective defense barrier was exploded. India’s naive confidence in China’s friendliness had dulled her perception re­garding effective security measures in the India- China borderlands. The prompt and positive re­sponse of western countries in rushing military sup­plies to the war zone helped to improve the image of the West in Indian eyes. India also realized that the posture of ‘non-alignment’ was no substitute for defense preparedness.

The aim of the Chinese invasion of 1962 was to deprive India of its moral leadership in the world especially among the Afro-Asian countries, and to put pressure on it to join the socialist camp. China! Collusion with Pakistan is a clear indication of (till political ambition. China, it seems, had miscalculated its political power strategy. The support of Western countries compelled China to rethink strategy.

India’s unity in the face of Chinese aggresses was another deterrent for China to achieve political mileage. China’s abortive action was motivated by law, custom, treaties, the facts of geography or administration, but rather by pure ideological, political and strategic considerations. Since the change of diplomatic representatives at the ameba’s sidereal level, both the countries are engaged in improving relations on a broader base.

The leaden of both the countries are working towards improving trade and cultural relations at the initial stage and delicate issue of border settlement later on. Sinai then a number of meetings have been held tore solve the problem of boundary disputes. With the recently visit of the Chinese president to India, China seems to have softened her attitude and has shown indications to resolve the crisis. In fact, in the contemporary global scenario if Asia and Africa have to freed from the growing impact of economic hegemony and neo-colonialism these two Asian giants should 1 patch up their differences and develop mutual co­operation.