100 sample question on law of Torts for Delhi Judiciary Service Examination

1. Basically tort is a species of

(a) criminal injury or wrong

(b) substantial injury or wrong

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(c) civil injury or wrong

(d) none of above.

2. A civil wrong is one which gives rise to

(a) civil proceeding (enforcement or right claimed by a party as against other party)

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(b) criminal proceeding (object of punish­ment of defaulting party for some act which he is accused)

(c) both (a) and (b)

(d) none of above.

3. The definition of ‘tort’ is contained in

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(a) The General Clauses Act, 1897

(b) The Limitation Act, 1963

(c) The Indian Contract Act, 1872

(d) The Indian Penal Code, 1860.

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4. Salmond has defined ‘tort’ as

(a) a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of trust or other merely eq­uitable obligation

(b) tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law to­wards the persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages

(c) an infringement of a right in rem of a private individual giving a right of compensation at the suit of the injured party

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(d) none of the above.

5. Frazer has defined tort as

(a) a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of trust or other merely eq­uitable obligation

(b) tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law to­wards the persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages

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(c) an infringement of a right in rem of a private individual giving a right of compensation at the suit of the injured party

(d) none of the above.

6. Winfield defined ‘tort’ as

(a) a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of trust or other merely eq­uitable obligation

(b) tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law to­wards the persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages

(c) an infringement of a right in rem of a private individual giving a right of compensation at the suit of the injured party

(d) none of the above.

7. Section 2(m) of Limitation Act defines tort as

(a) a civil wrong which is not exclusively a breach of contract or breach of trust

(b) a civil wrong which includes breach of contract or breach of trust

(c) a civil wrong which includes breach of contract but not breach of trust

(d) a civil wrong which includes breach of trust but not breach of contract.

8. Tort is redressible by an action

(a) for restoration of original position

(b) for unliquidated damages

(c) for liquidated damages

(d) all the above.

9. The duty under the Law of tort is

(a) towards a specific individual

(b) towards a group of individuals

(c) towards the world at large

(d) both (a) & (b).

10. Which is correct

(a) breach of contract results from breach of duty undertaken by the parties themselves whereas tort results from breach of duty imposed by law

(b) contract is right in personam whereas tort infringes right in rem

(c) under contract the damages can be liq­uidated or unliquidated but under tort the damages are always unliquidated

(d) all the above.

11. The principle of privity of contract was held to be not applicable in an action for tort in

(a) Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 10 M&W 109

(b) Donoghue v. Stevenson, (1932) AC 562

(c) Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd., (1936) AC 85

(d) Ashby v. White, (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938.

12. The ‘tort of deceit’ owe its origin to

(a) Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 3 TR 51

(b) Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E&B 216

(c) Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330

(d) Winsmore v. Greenbank, (1745) Willes 577.

13. The ‘tort of inducement a breach of contract’ finds its origin in

(a) Lumley v. Gye

(b) Rookes v. Barnard

(c) Donoghue v. Stevenson

(d) Rylands v. Fletcher.

14. The ‘tort of intimidation’ was propounded in

(a) Winterbottom v. Wright

(b) Pasley v. Freeman

(c) Winsmore v. Greenbank

(d) Rookes v. Barnard.

15. The rule of ‘strict liability’ is based on the decision in

(a) Donoghue v. Stevenson

(b) Reylands v. Fletcher

(c) Lumley v. Gye

(d) Champman v. Pickersgill.

16. The principle ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ was recognised in

(a) Winterbotton v. Wright

(b) Champman v. Pickersgill

(c) Ashby v. White

(d) Rylands v. Fletcher.

17. Tort is a violation of

(a) a right in personam

(b) a right in rem

(c) both right in personam & a right in rem

(d) neither a right in personam nor a right in rem.

18. Tort implies a twisted or tortious

(a) consent

(b) volition

(c) conduct

(d) deterrence.

19. Law of tort has developed mainly through

(a) customs & precedents

(b) judicial decisions

(c) enactments

(d) all the above.

20. The propounder of pigeon hole theory is

(a) Salmond

(b) Winfield

(c) Clerk & Lindsell

(d) Austin.

21. ‘ubi jus ibi remedium’ means

(a) where there is a right, there is a remedy

(b) there is no remedy without a wrong

(c) there is no wrong without a remedy

(d) there is no right without a remedy.

22. Maxim injuria sine damno means

(a)violation of a legal right without any damage

(b) violation of a legal right with damage

(c) damage without violation of legal right

(d) no damage & no violation of legal right.

23. The maxim ‘injuria sine damno’ has been ex­plained in

(a) Danoghere v. Stevenson

(b) Winterbottom v. Wright

(c) Ashby v. White

(d) Lumley v. Gye.

24. Maxim ‘Damnum sine injuria’ means

(a) damage without infringement of legal right

(b) damage with infringement of legal right

(c) infringement of legal right without damage

(d) infringement of legal right with dam­age.

25. In India the maxim ‘Damnum sine injuria’ has been propounded in

(a) P. Seetharammayya v. Mahalaksh-mamma

(b) Vishnu Dutt v. Board of H.S. & Intermedi­ate Education, U.P.

(c) Town Area Committee v. Prabhu Dayal

(d) all the above.

26. Gloucester Grammer School case explains

(a) injuria sine damno

(b) damnum sine injuria

(c) respondents superior

(d) remoteness of damages.

27. In tortious liability

(a) state of mind of a person is relevant

(b) state of mind of a person is irrelevant

(c) state of mind is relevant in some cases while is irrelevant in other cases

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

28. Malice in law means

(a) wrongful act done intentionally but without just cause or excuse

(b) wrongful act done intentionally with just cause & excuse

(c) wrongful act done intentionally with good motive

(d) wrongful act done intentionally with evil motive.

29. Malice in fact means a wrongful act done in­tentionally

(a) without evil motive

(b) with evil motive

(c) without any just cause or excuse

(d) with good motive.

30. Under the Law of torts, the damages are

(a) liquidated

(b) limited

(c) unliquidated

(d) unliquidated but limited.

31. To constitute a tort

(a) there must be some act or omission on the part of the defendant

(b) the act or omission should result in vio­lation of a- legal right vested in the plaintiff

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) either of the two.

32.

(A) Every wrongful act for which there is no justification or excuse be treated as tort

judicial Service Examination

(B) Only a number of specific wrongs beyond which the liability under this branch of law cannot arise

(a) both are correct

(b) Winfield preferred (A)

(c) Salmond preferred (B)

(d) all (a), (b) & (c) are correct.

33. The decision in Ashby v. White Furthers

(a) Salmond theory

(b) Winfield theory

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

34. Volenti non fit injuria is

(a) a defence in an action for torts

(b) a ground for initiation action for torts

(c) not a defence in an action for torts

(d) both (b) & (c) above.

35. The maxim ‘volenti non fit injuria’ applies

(a) when one is compelled to do work de­spite his protest

(b) when one adopts a risky method of work under his own free will

(c) when one works under constant risk of life but during the accident, he was not warned though he is aware of the risk

(d) both (a) & (c).

36. Under the Law of torts, malice means

(a) a wilful act done without just cause or excuse, known as malice in law

(b) a wilful act done with evil motive, known as malice in fact

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

37. The defence of volenti non fit injuria, is not available

(a) if the consent is obtained by compul­sion

(b) if the consent is obtained by fraud

(c) if the consent is obtained under a mis­take

(d) all the above.

38. The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur action implies & means

(a) from an immoral cause also action arises

(b) from an immoral cause no action arises

(c) morality and immorality is of no sig­nificance in an action for tort

(d) both (a) & (c).

39. A music teacher committing sexual inter­course with a minor girl having obtained her consent for the same on the pretext of that the same is required to improve her voice, was held guilty of rape in

(a) R.v.Catherine

(b) R. v. Clarence

(c) Ashby v. White

(d) R. v. Williums.

40. For volenti non-fit injuria to be available, it is necessary that

(a) the plaintiff knows that risk is there

(b) the plaintiff agrees to suffer the harm

(c) the plaintiff knowing that risk is there, agrees to suffer the harm

(d) all the above.

41. Volenti nonfit injuria is available

(a) when one works contravening the statutory provisions

(b) when one works ignoring the employer instructions

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

42. Volenti nonfit injuria is available

(a) when the plaintiff consents to take risk but the defendant is negligent

(b) when the plaintiff consents to take risk and the defendant is also not negligent

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

43. The scope of availability of the defence of violenti non-fit injuria

(a) has been restricted in rescue cases

(b) has been restricted by the Unfair Con­tract Term Act, 1977 in England

(c) cannot be restricted except in cases of consent without free will

(d) (a) & (b) above.

44. ‘When the plaintiff himself is a wrongdoer, he is not disentitled from recovering in tort unless some unlawful act or conduct on his own part is connected with the harm suf­fered by him as part of the same transaction’ is stated by

(a) Sir Garfield Pollock

(b) Sir Frederick Pollock

(c) Salmond

(d) Winfield.

45. Inevitable accident means

(a) an act of God

(b) an unexpected injury which could not have been foreseen & avoided

(c) an unexpected injury which could not have been foreseen & avoided

(d) both (a) & (b).

46. The ‘act of God’ or ‘Vis major’ is

(a) an extraordinary occurrence of circum­stances, which could not have been foreseen & which could not have been guarded against

(b) an accident due to natural causes with­out human intervention

(c) an accident due to natural causes with human intervention

(d) both (a) & (b).

47. In tort the private defence is

(a) not available

(b) is available to protect one’s person as under criminal law

(c) is available to protect one’s property as under criminal law

(d) both (b) & (c).

48. In tort, mistake

(a) of law is a defence

(b) of fact is a defence

(c) is no defence

(d) of law & of fact both are defence.

49. Necessity is available as defence

(a) when harm is caused intentionally to prevent a greater evil

(b) when harm is caused intentionally to prevent a smaller evil

(c) when harm is caused intentionally to prevent no evil

(d) all of the above.

50. Immunity from actions under statutory au­thority is

(a) restricted to harms which are obvious to the exercise of authority

(b) restrict to harms which are incidental to the exercise of such authority

(c) available not only for that harm which is obvious but also for that harm which is incidental to the exercise of such au­thority

(d) both (a) & (b).

51. Which of the following is correct

(a) where a statute gives an absolute au­thority, there is no liability even if some nuisance or other harm necessarily re­sults

(b) when the statute gives a conditional authority there is no liability if no nui­sance or some other harm is caused

(c) when the statute gives a conditional authority there is no liability even if some nuisance or other harm is caused

(d) both (a) & (b).

52. Act of State means

(a) an exercise of power against an alien and neither intended nor purporting to be regally founded

(b) an exercise of power against his own subjects

(c) an exercise of power against the alien as well as his own subjects

(d) none of the above.

53. Act of State

(a) cannot be between a sovereign and the subjects of another State

(b) cannot be between a sovereign and his own subjects

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

54. An act done as Act of State

(a) can be questioned in municipal courts with all facets

(b) can be questioned in municipal courts to a limited extent

(c) cannot be questioned at all in munici­pal courts

(d) none of the above.

55. An act done as Act of State has to be justi­fied

(a) on positive law of the land

(b) on political expediency

(c) on positive law & political expediency both

(d) none of the above.

56. Action of State vis-a-vis his own subjects has to be justified

(a) on positive law of the land

(b) on political expediency

(c) both on positive law of the land and political expediency

(d) none of the above.

57. In torts

(a) a minor is liable in the same manner & to the same extent as an adult

(b) a minor is not liable at all as under the law of contract

(c) a minor is liable in the same manner & not the same extent as an adult in re­-spect of torts which do not require a special mental element

(d) none of the above.

58. When two or more persons commit some tort against the same person they are

(a) independent tort feasors

(b) joint tort feasors

(c) either independent tort feasors or join tort feasors

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

59. Independent tort feasors

(a) are two or more persons acting inde-­pendently concur to produce a single damage

(b) are two or more persons acting inde-­pendently at the same time produce different damages

(c) are two or- more persons acting inde-­pendently at different times produce different damages

(d) are two or more person acting jointly at the same time produce different dam-ages.

60. The liability of independent tort feasors

(a) joint only

(b) several only

(c) joint & several

(d) neither joint nor several.

61. Joint tort feasers

(a) two or more persons acting in further­-ance of a common design cause a single damage

(b) two or more persons acting in further-ance of a common design cause differ­ent damages

(c) two or more persons acting in further-­ance of a common design, at different times, cause different damages

(d) all the above.

62. The liability of joint tort feasors is

(a) only joint

(b) only several

(c) joint & several

(d) neither joint nor several.

63. When two or more persons are responsible for common damage

(a) while acting independently are called composite tort feasors

(b) while acting jointly are called compos­ite tort feasors

(c) while acting either independently or jointly, are called composite tort feasers

(d) neither acting jointly nor indepen­dently are called composite tort feasors.

64.In case of joint tort feasors

(a) release of one of them releases all the others, as cause of action being one & indivisible 70.

(b) release of one of them does not release all the others as cause of action though one but divisible

(c) release of one of them does not release all of them despite the cause of action being one & indivisible

(d) none of the above.

65. In case of joint tort feasors

(a) the cause of action is only one & indi­visible

(b) the cause of action is only one but di­visible

(c) the cause of action is more than one & divisible

(d) the cause of action is more than one but connected.

66. In case of independent tort feasors

(a) the cause of action is only one & indi­visible

(b) the cause of action is only one but di- visible

(c) there can be as many causes of actions as the number of tort feasors

(d) all the above.

67. In case of independent tort feasors

(a) action against one bars the action against the others

(b) action against some bars the action against the others

(c) action against one does not bar action against the other

(d) both (a) & (b).

68. In England successive actions under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, 1978 are permissible in case

(a) of independent tort feasors

(b) of joint tort feasors

(c) of independent and joint tort feasors

(d) none of the above.

69. A covenant not to sue one of the joint tort feasors, has the effect of

(a) releasing all the tort feasors

(b) releasing only that joint tort feasors and others one not released

(c) not releasing even the joint tort feasors to whom the covenant relates

(d) none of the above.

70. The doctrine of vicarious liability applies when there is a

(a) relationship of principal & agent

(b) relationship of partners

(c) relationship of master & servant

(d) all the above.

71. Vicarious liability commensurates with that of

(a) independent tort feasors

(b) joint tort feasors

(c) composite tort feasors

(d) both (a) & (c).

72. Under the rule of vicarious liability

(a) master is liable for the torts committed by his servant

(b) employer is liable for the torts commit­ted by his employee

(c) employer is not liable for the torts com­mitted by an independent contractor

(d) both (a) & (b) are incorrect.

73. An employer is liable for the acts of inde­pendent contractors if

(a) the employer authorises doing an ille­gal act by the independent contractor

(b) the employer subsequently satisfies the act of independent contractor

(c) there is a strict liability

(d) all the above.

74. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability a master is liable for the acts of his servant

(a) only if the servant is under the control of the master as regards the manner in which the work is to be done

(b) only if the servant is not under the con­trol of the master as regards the man­ner of doing work

(c) irrespective of whether the servant is under the control of the master or not as regards the manner of doing the work

(d) all are correct.

75. Under the vicarious liability, the liability is

(a) joint only

(b) several only

(c) joint & several

(d) any of the above depending on the facts & circumstances.

76. ‘B’ asked his friend ‘C’ to drive his (B’s) car, ‘C’ drives and causes an accident with an­other car of ‘D’ in an action brought by D

(a) B alone is liable as ‘C’ was acting under his direction

(b) ‘B’ is not at all liable as ‘C’ is not his servant

(c) ‘C’ is not liable as he was driving the car at ‘B’s instructions

(d) ‘B’ & ‘C’ both are liable by the rule of vicarious liability.

77. For the purposes of vicarious liability a ser­vant is a person

(a) on whom the master has command of what to do & how to do

(b) on whom the master has a command of what to do

(c) whom the master can hire & fire

(d) only (a) & (c) above.

78. Vicarious liability in case of independent contractor does not arise

(a) as only what to do is present

(b) as only how to do is present

(c) as none of the two is present

(d) as none of the two is absent.

79. Vicarious liability of master arises

(a) in case of theft of property of a third person bailed to the master

(b) in case of theft of property of a third person not bailed to the master

(c) neither (a) nor (b) as the act of commit­ting theft is not covered

(d) Both (a) and (b) as it makes no differ­ence whether the goods are bailed or not bailed to the master.

80. Which is correct. In tort

(a) mental element is totally irrelevant

(b) mental element is absolutely relevant

(c) mental element is relevant only in cases of torts requiring special mental ele­ment

(d) none of the above.

81. The doctrine of common employment means

(a) if the wrongdoer servant and the per­-son injured are fellow servants, the master is not liable

(b) if the wrongdoer servant and the per-­son injured are fellow servants, master is liable

(c) if the wrongdoer servant and the per-­son injured are not fellow servants, master is not liable

(d) none of the above.

82. The doctrine of common employment at present is applicable

(a) in India only

(b) in England only

(c) in India as well as England

(d) neither in India nor in England.

83. In India, the scope of the doctrine of com­mon employment was restricted by

(a) The Indian Employers’ Liability Act, 1938

(b) The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923

(c) The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948

(d) all the above.

84. In India, the defence of common employ­ment

(a) stands abolished in 1951

(b) has been partly abolished in 1951

(c) is still available today

(d) none of the above.

85. The term novus actus interveniens means

(a) directness of damages

(b) remoteness of damages

(c) direct & remote damages

(d) foreseable damages.

86. Remoteness of damages is determined by

(a) the test of directness

(b) the test of reasonable foresight

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) none of the above.

87. The test of reasonable foresight in deter­mining the remoteness of damages was first applied in

(a) Re: Polerris

(b) Wagon Mannd case

(c) Doughty v. Turner Manufacturing Co. Ltd.

(d) S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Sons.

88. When an agent commits a tort in the perfor­mance of his duty as an agent, the person injured can sue

(a) the wrongdoer agent only

(b) the principal only

(c) either the wrongdoer agent or the prin­cipal

(d) either the agent or the principal or both.

89. For ‘false imprisonment’ there should be

(a) total restraint on the liberty of a person

(b) a partial restraint on the liberty of a person

(c) means of escape

(d) all the above.

90. Defamation is divided into libel and slan­der under

(a) English law only

(b) Indian law only

(c) both under English law and Indian law

(d) none of the above.

91. Slander is the publication of a defamatory statement in a

(a) transient form

(b) permanent form

(c) either transient or permanent form

(d) both transient & permanent form.

92. Libel is a publication of a defamatory state­ment in a

(a) transient form

(b) permanent form

(c) both in transient & permanent form

(d) either transient or permanent form.

93. Which of the following is not actionable as a tort of defamation

(a) hasty expression spoken in anger or vulgar abuses

(b) words which injure the feelings or cause annoyance but not reflecting on the character

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

94. When the ‘innuendo’ is proved

(a) the words which are not defamatory in ordinary sense may become defama­tory

(b) the words which are defamatory in or­dinary sense may become non-defama- tory

(c) the words which are not defamatory in ordinary sense shall remain non defa­matory

(d) the words which are defamatory in or­dinary sense shall remain defamatory.

95. For defamation

(a) intention to defame is not necessary

(b) intention to defame is necessary

(c) statement made believing is to be inno­cent makes a difference

(d) either (a) or (c).

96. For defamation, a tort

(a) should be in respect of a living person only

(b) can be in respect of a deceased person

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) either (a) or (b).

97. Action for defamation can be brought by

(a) an individual

(b) a partnership firm

(c) a company

(d) both (a) & (c).

98. Which is correct

(a) sending a defamatory letter to a person in a language believed to be known to that person is no defamation

(b) wrongfully reading of any such letter by a third person is no defamation

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

99. In an action for defamation under civil law

(a) truth of a defamatory matter is no de­fence

(b) truth of a defamatory matter is a com­plete defence

(c) truth of a defamatory matter is a partial defence

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

100. Making fair comment on matters of public interest is

(a) a defence to an action for defamation

(b) no defence to an action for defamation

(c) a partial defence to an action for defamation

(d) none of the above.