Brief notes on the concept of Non-existence or Abava

We have dealt with the six positive categories above. Now we come to the negative category of abhava or non-existence, which does not come under any of the six categories. The reality of non­existence cannot be denied.

Looking at the sky at night you feel as much sure of the non-existence of the sun there, as of the existence of the moon and the stars. The Vaisesika recognizes, therefore, non-existence as the seventh category of reality.

It is true that Kanada did not mention abhava as a separate category in the enumeration of the ultimate objects of knowledge (padiirtha). Hence some people think that he was in favour of accepting only six categories.

But in view of the facts that non­existence as a possible object of knowledge has been discussed in other parts of the Vaisesikn-Sutra and that later commentators have treated it as the seventh category, we propose to consider it as such.

Pragabhava or antecedent non-existence is the non-existence of a thing before its production. When one says, ‘a house will be built with bricks,’ there is non-existence of the house in the bricks.

This non-existence of a house in the bricks before its construction is pragabhava. It means the absence of a connection between the bricks and the house which has not yet been built with them.

The house never existed before being built, so that its non-existence before construction has no beginning (anadi).

When, however, the house is built, its previous non-existence comes to an end (anta). Hence it is that pragabhava is said to be without a beginning, but having an end (anadi and santa).

Dhvamsabhava is the non-existence of a thing on account of its destruction after production. Ajar which has been produced by a potter may be subsequently broken into pieces.

When the jar is broken into pieces, there is its non-existence in those pieces. This non-existence of a previously existing thing, due to its destruction is called dhvamsabhava. It is said to have a beginning (sadi), but no end (ananta).

The non-existence of the jar begins with its destruction, but it cannot be ended in any way, for the very same jar cannot be brought back into existence.

It will be seen here that although in the case of positive entities (bhava padartha), the general rule is that, whatever is produced must be destroyed, in the case of negative entities (abhava padartha), something which is produced cannot be destroyed.

The non­existence of the jar is produced by its destruction, but that non­existence cannot itself be destroyed. To destroy or end the jar s non-existence, we are to restore the same jar to existence, which is impossible.

Atvantabhava or absolute non-existence is the absence of a connection between two things for all time-past, present and future, e.g. the non-existence of colour in air. It is thus different from pragabhava and dhvamsabhava.

Pragabhava is the non­existence of a thing before its production. Dhvamsabhava is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction.

But atyantabhava is the non-existence of a thing, not in any particular time, but for all time. So it is not subject neither to origin nor to cessation, i.e. it is both beginningless and endless (anadi and ananta)

While samsargabhava is the absence of a connection between two things, anyonyabhava underlines the difference (bheda) of one thing from another thing.

When one thing is different from another thing, they mutually exclude each other and there is the non-existence of either as the other.

A table is different from a chair. This means that a table does not exist as a chair, or, more simply, a table is not a chair. Anyonyabhava is this non-existence of one thing as another, from which it is different.

Thus samsargabhava is the absence of a connection (samsarga) between two entities, and its opposite is just their connection. On the other hand, anyonabhava is the absence of one thing as another, and its opposite is just their sameness or identity.

Take the following illustrations: ‘A hare has no horn,’ ‘there is no colour in air’ are propositions which express the absence of a connection between a hare and a horn, between colour and air.

The opposite of these will be the propositions ‘a hare has horns,’ ‘there is colour in air.’ ‘A cow is not a horse,’ ‘ajar is not a cloth’ are propositions which express the difference between a cow and a horse, a jar and a cloth.

The opposite of these will be the Propositions ‘a cow is a horse’, ‘ajar is a cloth.’ Thus we may that sarhsargabhava is relative non-existence in the sense of a negation of the presence (samsarga) of some thing in some other thing.

While anyonyabhava is mutual non-existence or difference in the sense of a negation of the identity (tadatmya) between two objects.

Like atyantabhava or absolute non-existence anyonyabhava or mutual non-existence is without a beginning and an end i.e. is eternal.