A dravya or substance is that in which a quality or an action can exist, but which is distinct from both

A dravya or substance is that in which a quality or an action can exist, but which is distinct from both. Without substance there can be no quality or action. A thing must be or exist, if it is to have any quality or action belonging to it.

So a substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. It is also the constitutive or material cause (samavayikarana) of other composite things produced from it.

Thus a cloth is a composite thing formed by the combination of a number of threads of a certain colour.

Now the threads are the material or constitutive causes of the clot, because it is made of threads and subsists in them. Similarly, wood and lead are the material causes of a wooden pencil because it is made of them.

There are nine kinds of substances, namely, earth or prithhiv, water or jalap, light or teas, air or vatu, ether or a base, time or kale, space or dike, soul or atman, and mind or manas.

Of these the first five are called physical elements (pancabhhuta), since each of them possesses a specific or peculiar quality (visesa guna) which is sensed by an external sense. Smell is the peculiar property of earth.

Other substances have smell only as they are mixed up with some quantity of earth. There is smell in muddy water, but no smell in water which is pure. Taste is the peculiar property of water, colour of light, touch of air, and sound of akasa or ether.

These five specific qualities are sensed by the five external senses. Each of the senses is constituted by the physical element whose specific quality is sensed by it.

The sense of smell is constituted by the element of earth, the sense of taste by water, the sense of sight by light, that of touch by air, and that of hearing by akasa.

We find that earthy substances, like odoriferous particles in smelling objects, manifest the quality of smell. From this we conclude that the sense of smell which manifests smell is constituted by earth.

For similar reasons it is held that the senses of taste, sight, touch and hearing are respectively made of the elements of water, light, air and ether.

The substances of earth, water, light, and air are of two kinds, namely, eternal (nitya) and non-eternal (anitya). The atoms (paramanu) of earth, water, light and air are eternal, because an atom is partless and can be neither produced nor destroyed.

All other minds of earth, water, etc. are non-eternal, because they are produced by the combination of atoms, and are, therefore, subject to disintegration and destruction. We cannot ordinarily perceive an atom.

The existence of atoms is known by an inference like this: the ordinary composite objects of the world like jars, tables, and chairs, are made up of parts. Whatever is produced must be made up of parts, for to produce a thing is to combine certain parts in a certain way.

Now if we go on separating the parts of a composite thing, we shall pass from larger to smaller, from smaller to still smaller, and from these to the smallest parts which cannot be further divided in any way.

These indivisible and minutest parts are called paramanus or atoms. An atom cannot be produced, because it has no parts, and to produce means to combine parts.

Nor can it be destroyed, for to destroy a thing is to break it up into its parts, whereas the atom has no parts. Thus being neither produced nor destrucdble, the atoms or the smallest parts of a thing is eternal.

The atoms are different in kind. There are four kinds of atoms, namely, of earth, water, light and air, each having its peculiar quality.

The Vaisesika view is thus different from that of the Greek atomists like Democritus who believe that all atoms are of the same kind, and that they differ in quantity and not in quality.

Akasa is the fifth physical substance which is the substratum of the quality of sound. While sound is perceived, akasa cannot be perceived.

There are two conditions of the external perception of a substance, namely, that it must have a perceptible dimension (mahattva) and manifest colour (udbhutarupavattva). Akasa is not a limited and coloured substance.

Akasa is an all-pervading bearer of the quality of sound and is inferred from the percepdon diat quality. Every quality must belong to some substance.

Sound is not a quality of the earth, water, light and air, because ^lbe qualities of these substances are not perceived by the ear, while sound is perceived by our ears. Further, there may be sound in regions reladvely free from the influence of these substances.

Nor can sound belong as a quality to space; time, soul and mind, for these exist even when there is no sound to qualify them. So there must be some other substance called akasa or ether of which sound is the quality.

It is one and eternal because it is not made up of parts and does not depend on any other substance for its existence. It is all-pervading in the sense that it has an unlimited dimension and its quality, sound, is perceived everywhere.

Space (dik) and time (kala) are, like akasa, imperceptible substances each of which is one, eternal and all-pervading. Space is inferred as the ground of our cognitions of ‘here’ and ‘there’, ‘near’ and ‘far’.

Time is the cause of our cognitions of ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’, ‘older’ and ‘younger’. Although one and indivisible, akasa, space and time are distinguished into different parts and thus conventionally, spoken of as many by reason of certain limiting conditions (upadhi) which affect our knowledge of them.

Thus the expressions ‘the ether enclosed by ajar’, ‘that by a house’, ‘filled and empty space’, ‘the east and the west’, ‘a minute and hour and a day’ are due to the apparent distinctions, made by certain conditions, in what is really one ether, one space and one time.

The soul (atma) is an eternal and all-pervading substance which is the substratum of the phenomena of consciousness. There are two kinds of souls, namely, the individual soul (jivatma) and the supreme soul (paramatma or Isvara).

The latter is one and is inferred as the creator of the world. The former is internally or mentally perceived as possessing some quality when, for example, one says, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am sorry,’ and so forth. The individual self is not one but many being different in different bodies.

Mana, which is a substance, is the internal sense (antarindriya) for the perception of the individual soul and its qualities, like pleasure and pain.

It is atomic and cannot, therefore, be perceived-Its existence is inferred from the following grounds:

(a) Just as in the perception of the external objects of the world, we require the external senses, so in the perception of internal objects, like the soul, cognition, feeling and willing, there must be an internal sense, to which we give the name of mind (manas).

(b) Secondly, we find that although the five external senses may be in contact with their respective objects at the same time, we do not have simultaneous percepdons of colour, touch, sound, taste and smell.

But why must this be so? If when talking to a friend in your house, your eyes are in contact with his facial expressions, your ears are in contact with the rumbling sound of the tram car outside, and your skin is in contact with the clothes you wear, you should have simultaneous perception of the friend’s face, of the tram car and of the clothes.

But you do not get all these perceptions at the same time. This shows that over and above the contact between the external senses and their objects, there must be some other cause which limits the number of perceptions to one at and the order of perceptions to one of succession, i.e. one after the other and not all together.

Of the different objects which may be in contact with our external senses at one and the same time, we perceive only that to which we are attentive. This means that we must attend to, or turn our mind (manas) and fix it on (manoyoga), the object of perception.

So every perception requires the contact of the mind (manas) with the object through its contact with the sense organ in question. That is, we must admit the existence of manas as an internal sense.

That the manas are partless or atomic also follows from the order of succession among our experiences.

If the mind were not an infinitesimal or partless entity, there could have been simultaneous contract of its many parts with many senses, and so the appearance of many perceptions at one and the same time.

But as this is not the case, we are to say that the manas is partless or atomic, and functions as an internal sense of perception. It is the organ through which the soul attends to objects.