The Indian army was carefully reorganised after 1858, most of all to prevent the recurrence of another revolt. The rulers had seen that their bayonets were the only secure foundation of their rule.
Several steps were taken to minimise, if not completely eliminate, the capacity of Indian soldiers to revolt. First, the domination of the army by its European branch was carefully guaranteed.
The proportion of Europeans to Indians in the army was raised and fixed at one to two in the Bengal army and two to five in the Madras and Bombay armies. Further, the European troops were kept in key geographical and military positions.
The crucial branches of the army like artillery and, later in the twentieth century, tanks and armoured corps were put exclusively in European hands. The older policy of excluding Indians from the officer corps was strictly maintained.
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Till 1914 no Indian could rise higher than the rank of a subedar. Second, the organisation of the Indian section of the army was based on the policy of ‘balance and counterpoise’ or ‘divide and rule’ so as to prevent its chance of uniting again in an anti-British uprising.
Discrimination on the basis of caste, region and religion was practised in recruitment to the army. A fiction was created that Indians consisted of ‘martial’ and ‘non-martial’ classes Soldiers from Awadh, Bihar, central India, and south India, who had first helped the British conquer India but had later taken part in the Revolt of 1857, were declared to be non-martial.
They were no longer taken in the army on a large scale. On the other hand, Punjabis, Gurkhas, and Pathans who had assisted in the suppression of the Revolt, were declared to be martial and were recruited in large numbers.
By 1875, half of the British Indian army was recruited from Punjab. In addition, Indian regiments were made up of a mixture of various castes and groups which were so placed as to balance each other.
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Communal, caste, tribal and regional loyalties were encouraged among the soldiers so that the sentiment of nationalism would not grow among them.
For example, caste and communal companies were introduced in most regiments. Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Viceroy Canning in 1861:
I never wish to see again a great army, very much the same in its feelings and prejudices and connections, confident in its strength, and so disposed to rise in rebellion together. If one regiment mutinies, I should like to have the next regiment so alien that it would be ready to fire into it.
Thus the Indian army remained a purely mercenary force. Moreover, every effort was made to keep it separated from the life and thoughts of the rest of the population.
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It was isolated from nationalist ideas by every possible means. Newspapers, journals and nationalist publications were prevented from reaching the soldiers.
But, as we shall see later, all such efforts failed in the long run and sections of the Indian army played an important role in India’s struggle for freedom.
The Indian army became in time a very costly military machine. In 1904 it absorbed nearly 52 per cent of the Indian revenues. This was because it served more than one purpose.
India, being the most prized colonial possession of the time, had to be constantly defended from the competing imperialisms of Russia, France and Germany.
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This led to a big increase in the size of the Indian army. Second, the Indian troops were not maintained for India’s defense alone.
The Indian army was the chief instrument for the expansion and consolidation of British power and possessions in Asia and Africa. Lastly the British section of the army served as an army of occupation.
It was the ultimate guarantee of the British hold over the country. Its cost had, however, to be met by Indian revenues; it was in fact a very heavy burden on them.