Essay on Decentralized Planning In the Indian Polity

Essay on Decentralized Planning In the Indian Polity

Introduction:

After independence, development through planning and state initiative was the aim of policy makers. With the establishment of the planning commission at the national level and the launching of the first Five- year plan.

In 1951, the planning process started in the country. In the course of time, planning and development have become household words in the coun­try today.

Development of Thought:

In the beginning, a two level planning was initiated at the national and state levels. The planners and policy makers did, however, realise the limitation of this system for a country’ as huge in size and diversity as India.

They felt that multi level planning was needed if the fruits of development were to reach the grass roots level also. There was always a possibility of losing sight of problems, requirements potentials of the areas much below the state level while planning headquarters.

This dichotomy of establishing a mechanism which was inadequate and hoping at the same time, that a lot more needed to be done has been a char­acteristic feature of development on the theme of decentralized planning in the country.

This write up attempts to review the efforts made at the national level in this direction as also the current status of its practice at the operational level. In this process, some basic issues have been posed which need serious consideration by the planners and policy makers at the highest level.

Conclusion:

District planning, is more a formality than a reality. In fact, to call It planning, a lot of terminological liberalism has to be com­manded. Hence, the operational failures in agriculture, rural infrastructure and social services programmes, witnessed in the country, are attributable to the lack of effective planning at the lower levels.

Like any other delegation of authority or powers, decentralized planning is also a delegation of authority or powers by State Government to districts in the field of planning. In other words, the implication is that the authority or powers will be better exercised in the interests of people after the same are delegated to districts.

But at the same time, it amounts to vesting districts with additional responsibilities.’ And once a decision on these responsibilities has been taken.

It becomes necessary to identify and provide support required to be given to districts in terms of qualified manpower and other resources to enable them and others concerned to discharge these responsibilities efficiently.

In case this sup­port is denied, it will recoil adversely on the performance of delegated functions. This calls for a multi-disciplinary technical planning cell at the district level.

The First Five-Year Plan, for instance, talked about breaking the national and state plans into local units based on district, town and villages.

It did not; however elaborate the manner in which this idea of decentralization would be put into operation, how the activities were to be disaggregated and how coordina­tion was to be achieved.

The Community Development Programme was the first experiment in this regard. The Community Development Blocks were established and an infrastruc­ture was created at the Block level for integration of the administrative and development functions.

The block level staff was entrusted with the responsibil­ity of initiating round development of the villages. This experiment at block level was closest to the idea of micro-level planning but it certainly lacked popular involvement.

This subject was discussed in the District Magistrates’ Conferences Gorakhpur, Jaipur, Bhopal, etc., which was addressed by the Prime Minister.

Four model District Plans were also presented in these conferences. The basic thrust was that the value of the district plan is derived from the fact that it reflects the real needs of the people and is close enough to them to adequately reflect their aspirations.

The Panchayati Raj institutions are bodies which could articu­late the needs and aspirations of the people. It was also suggested that a system of devolution of funds from the State Government to the districts should be clearly laid down.

In the process, the conference suggested setting up of a State Finance Commission so that funds could be allocated to the districts on the basis of well-defined criteria and that the levels of development in various districts could be taken into account while laying down the principles of resource allo­cation.

Though the need for decentralization has been successively stressed in the Five-Year Plans, only a few States of the Indian Union have actually tried to operationalise it. Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh belong to this cat­egory.

Now Bihar has also joined this group. Even in these States, the process has gone to one level below, i.e. district level only.

After the publication of the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee Report most of the States introduced Panchayati Raj Institutions. However, after the enthusiast- had died down, these institutions lost their importance because of long bouts of super session of the State leadership towards them. Wherever they exist, they do not exercise any control over district plan funds.

Instead of entrusting the job of district planning to the duly constituted Parishads, new planning bodies have been created at the district level for the decentralized planning work. In most of the States, these Panchayat bodies have not been associated in any manner with the formulation and monitoring of the district plans.

In some others, the Zila Parishads become subordinates to the district planning bodies. In still others, the Parishads have become implementing agencies.

The only exception was Karnataka where a comprehensive legislation “Karnataka Zila Parishad, Taluka Panchayat Samitis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats 1983” has been passed which has entrusted the Zila Parishads with all the functions of district planning.

During the years, many new autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies have mushroomed at the district level. Some of these (i.e. DRDA, TDA) have been established on the directives of Central Government. They have their district level functionaries and they work independently and are not part of the district planning bodies

A demarcation of activities between the State and the district has been done on the basis of twin norms of location and coverage of benefit, this classification is also not very accurate and scientific and many of the activities which ought to have been done by the districts have been retained at the State level.

The decentralized district plans are prepared at the district level strictly according to the guidelines and norms fixed at the State headquarters. This result in desegregation of State Plan into district plans and non district plan coming up with proposals based on local needs and requirements.

The devolution of plan funds, though based on population, area and level of development, does not give any elbow room to the district authorities to prepare ‘new” schemes, the funds given to districts and priorities fixed are hardly sufficient to carry on the continuing schemes and their contingent expansion.

In a few states, ‘incen­tive money’ or ‘united funds’ are allotted for preparing purely new schemes at the district level.

So far as the administrative and financial delegation is concerned, not much headway has been made. There is great resistance from the bureaucracy at the top level to shed their powers.

The old system of centralized accounting and budgetary system is still being followed. The rules, regulations and budgetary procedures have not been suitably modified to suit the requirements of the new process.

In almost all the States, the technical planning machinery at the district level is extremely inadequate both quantitatively and qualitatively. The idea of prepar­ing an integrated district development plan with clear-cut forward and backward linkages is a far cry.

The district plans prepared now with the one-man technical planning cell is simply a collection of sectoral plans prepared by different depart­mental heads at the district level.

The general position with regard to district planning has been aptly summarized by the Working Group on District Planning: “District planning in most of the States follows a similar pattern with minor variations. It seems to be a case of diverse structure and common characteristics.

Usually after the State budget is voted in the Assembly, the different Heads of Departments are required to make a district-wise break-up of the outlays provided in the plan budget. This is then communicated to the district either by sectoral departments or planning department of the State.

After communication is received, the district attempts to incorporate a write up for the district-wise outlay and a document called, ‘District Plan’ emerges in this manner which is purely an aggregation of Departmen­tal outlays”.

Thus, it is seen that there is a glaring contrast between the ideal concept of decentralized planning and the operational reality obtaining at the district level.

Given this background, it is proposed to pose a number of issues for de­fied consideration. In posing these issues, it is fully realized that the question decentralized planning should not be restricted to one planning technique but with reference to institutional structures.

One of the basic issues which emerges out of the above discussion is when there has been a genuine desire and will to decentralize it has been possible even in the limited field planning and development.

This, to a great extent, is the basic Prerequisite for success of decentralization and if it is there, the other pre-requisites, like delegation of technical planning machinery, etc., automatically follow.

The concept of decentralization is more than a technique of administration it is a philosophy which has a close relationship with the sharing of power and granting of autonomy to various levels.

Hence, it requires strong political will and commitment to the philosophy to push through the concept and to shift the line of decision-making and implementation closer to the people.

The political party in power at the Centre and its leadership always advo­cates in no uncertain terms, the need for the decentralization of the whole pro­cess of planning from the top level to the lower levels. All the Five-Year Plans and other documents have been testimony to this faith of the political leadership.

In a multi-level planning set-up, though there is some degree of consistency, interdependency, to some extent, yet each level has, within a broad sphere, freedom to plan and implement the programmes. Secondly, there is also a clear demarcation of functions between the Centre and States.

The Centre has 97 subjects whereas the State List contains 66 and the Centre can prevail even in the subjects in the Concurrent List which are 47 in number.

Social and economic matters are in the Concurrent List but most of the developmental and welfare activities concerned with planning are in the State sector. But the more than three decades of planning have tended to push the system to greater centralization.

Though the States have full freedom to prepare their own plans keeping in mind the national priorities and objectives, they have little freedom in this sphere because of the States on the Centre for resource development.

This depen­dence has further increased because of the demand of development. The Center’s share in the form of central plan assistance is a substantial portion of the total plan outlay of the States.

This heavy dependence on the Centre and the dominant role of the Planning Commission-a non-constitutional and non-statutory organization-has gradu­ally increased the Central control over the States. The Planning Commission involves two types of disciplines.

One, financial, in the sense of conforming to ceilings of States and Central resources settled in consultation with the Centre and substantiate that broad features, like targets, priorities, types of schemes, etc have to fit into the thinking at the national level. Further, the Central plan assistance is subject to approval of the plan by the Planning Commission which has to ensure the guidelines are observed, that the national plan targets will be fulfilled, and that provision has been made for core plan items. A shortfall in the approved plan invites penalty of a proportionate cut in Central Plan assistance.

Though, in theory, it fits in well with the concept of multi-level planning- in practice, it meant more of Central control.

The increase in the number of centrally sponsored schemes is yet an example of the trend towards centralization. The National Development Council had, in 1979.

Decided that centrally sponsored schemes should be limited in total value to one sixth or one seventh of the quantum of Central assistance to the States, but the actual position is quite otherwise. Both the number and quantum of Central assistance through these schemes has increased enormously.

In 1980- 81, this assistance was 47.3 per cent of normal Central assistance which in­creased to 73.74 per cent in 1984-85. The most notable part of these centrally sponsored schemes is that these relate to the subjects which fall approximately within the purview of the States.

The general criticism of these types of schemes was that they are drawn too rigidly leaving little scope for flexibility at the operational level and too much control by the Central ministries.

Further, these schemes are normally sponsored during the course of the implementation of a plan, resulting in undue financial hardships to the States as they have to provide a matching contribution in many of the schemes.

The system of this type of central assistance introduces considerable confu­sion, delay and uncertainty in the process of planning and cripples the initiative of the States.

Even when the Centre desires to introduce any new scheme on a country-wide basis, it could be correct, appropriate and wise to advise the States only on the broad outlines of the scheme and allow them to work it out with such modifications as may be required by local circumstances.

Otherwise it is difficult for any State Government to resist the financial bait that the centrally sponsored schemes offer.

In this limited sphere of planning, the States, therefore, come into conflict with the Centre and this conflict becomes sharper when the political leadership at the State level is ideologically different from that of the political leadership at the Centre.

In these States, the Centre uses the institution of the Planning Commission and the clearance of projects of importance as a mechanism of control over these States.

The same tendency of centralization is visible in more stronger terms at the State level because there is no constitutional safe-guards provided for the sub- state level as have been provided to the States under the Constitution. Local Government is included in the State list and it is for the State to pass legislation defining their scope and authority.

Though Panchayati Raj Institutions have been established under the banner of democratic decentralization, most of the time they have remained superseded and the bureaucracy have run these institutions as regular government depart­ments. The same is the case with urban local bodies.

During the period of super session, many of the activities have been taken out and regular departments have been entrusted with that job because it is much easier to control the departments than to control a democratic institution.

The Asoka Mehta Committee has identified the lukewarm attitude of the political elite at higher levels towards strengthening these local institutions as one of the crucial reasons which undermined the role of these bodies.

Wherever these PRIs existed, they were not given the responsibility of district planning though the Act specifically provided for it. Instead parallel executive bodies have been created.

Further, in many places, the elected repre­sentatives of PRIs were not included in their committees and only members of Parliament and State Legislatures were included.

This tendency of superseding the democratic-institutions and controlling them through officials is not confined to rural and urban local bodies.

It is seen in all the areas where there is a provision of duly elected body, be it cooperative institutions at all levels from State downwards, cane unions and councils and mandi samities. This has resulted in officialisation of all democratic institutions at the local levels.

But even in the sphere of planning, no genuine decentralization has taken place. Though most of the States have planning departments and few have State Planning Board also, the records show that these planning boards have very little role to play in the formulation of State plans.

Even the Plan document is not formally approved by these boards before submission to the Central Planning Commission.

The State Headquarters exercise same type of control and scrutiny with regard to district plans as is being done by the Central Planning Commission with State Plans.

Districts are strictly bound by the State guidelines and norms and they cannot deviate an inch from them with the result that district planning has become more of planning for the districts by the departments at the State level than by or of the districts.

They became a programming exercise only. Further, this scheme has not been fully backed up by administrative and financial decentralization with the result that for a petty purchase or minor re-appropria­tion of funds, the people have to run to the State Headquarters for sanctions. A lot of time and money is wasted in these small matters.

Thus, the states have also dot fared better than the Centre in the matter of genuine decentralization of planning process. The tendency of centralization is more prominent at the State level because of the complete dependence of dis­tricts in the matter of plan funds on the State and no constitutional recognition to that level.

It’s a fact that we have talked of decentralization for the last 35 years without giving it a genuine trial and also that we are not prepared to entrust it to the popularly elected representatives of the district. But why is this so? In order to find an answer to the basic question.

We will have to look into the larger question of social and political climate prevailing at the particular time. Some of the basic reasons for this types of tendency in a democratic set-up are summarized below

While development needs a direction towards decentralization, the political compulsions many at time pull towards centralization. Political parties in power which are uncertain of their position tend to resist and resent any attempt at setting up local organizations (other than their own) outside their control.

Political leaders at the level of members of Parliament or legislators or belonging to middle-level party hierarchy, do not tolerate, let alone encourage, independent grass root political leaders as they are seen as a threat to their power base.

In a multiparty country like India, these problems are further compounded by the possibility of different political parties controlling local institutions. In this context, the tendency to thwart moves towards the genuine devolution of power to local levels may become inevitable.

The Central and State leaderships look with suspicion at the emergence of any strong decentralized institutional political leadership and hence evolve ways and means of controlling the power and authorities at the decentralized levels.

Adequate political forces have yet to emerge strongly pushing for decen­tralization below the state level and such interest as has been shown by particular parties has been limited to the extent that they were themselves in a position to take advantage of it. Even among political parties in dominant positions and broadly committed to decentralization in principle, there has been fear of^– their leadership being undercut from below by elements belonging to other parties or even their own.

Such fears have grown in recent years as the coalition basis of political power and its resulting fragility have become more evident and correspondingly the tendencies towards centralization have also grown.

Decentralized planning presupposes active and effective involvement of people’s representatives. Therefore, the question arises as to what should be the institutional structure below the state level. The consensus of opinion is in favour of duly elected body like Zila Parishads.

To ensure this pattern and people’s participation, some have even suggested a constitutional amendment. In order to have regular elections and sessions, the Sarkaria Commission has suggested legislation analogous to Articles 172 and 174 of the Constitution.

What are the functions that have to be allotted to these institutions? A Planner has always to take a more comprehensive and total view of development. Fragmented approach often leads to wrong decisions.

The practice following hitherto of going from scheme to scheme to decide as to which of these should belong to ‘state sector or district sector’ has led to a situation where within a sector’ or ‘sub-sector’ schemes are divided between “state’ and ‘district’ sectors ‘hereby assigning the function for a sector or sub-sector to two parallel institutions whose perceptions may not necessarily be the same. This dual control and direction of planning may be counter-productive.

Identification of sub-sectors and their classification accordingly between district and state sector will be a more rational approach and apart from ensuring the advantage of unity of direction for a sub-sector as a whole, it will also stop frequent and erratic shuffling of schemes from one sector to another.

Even if some shuffling of sub-sectors is intended to be done, it would not be confined to one or two schemes, but a bunch of several schemes of a sub-sector, and because of the very numbers involved and their implications, the decisions in this regard may have to be taken after a very careful consideration.

Depending upon the view taken on this issue sub-sectors which are amenable to planning and control at the district level should belong to the ‘District Sector’.

After identification of functions, it is necessary to ensure that financial resources are available to the district to discharge the allotted functions. It has to be automatic devolution of finances and also powers to raise resources.

The experience in the past has shown that certain plan funds were ear­marked on an ad hoc basis for distribution to the districts and a formula based on population and backwardness has been adopted by various states. There is no resource generation at the local level for funding of the district plans.

This has resulted in inadequate flow of funds at the sub-state level. In regard to resource devolution, the Karnataka Act has made a provision for setting up a State Fi­nance Commission.

The Sarkaria Commission has also suggested a similar ar­rangement to enable the State Governments to take an objective view of re­sources to be devolved or transferred to the districts. A similar recommendation has also been made by the Conference of the District Magistrates.

Planning, implementation and administration are not separate and unrelated subsystems. The success of a model approved for one of them will largely depend upon whether, among other things, consequential changes have been made in models of other sub-systems also to make them harmonious and com­patible with each other.

In case, this harmony and compatibility is not estab­lished, the purpose for which the new model has been approved may not be achieved. At the end of it, it may even be wrongly concluded that the model has failed.

In the present case, changes, made in the subsystem of ‘Planning’ were not accompanied by changes, as required, in the sub-systems of administration and implementation.

These sub-systems remained, more or less, unchanged with the result that the modified model of planning is not working smoothly. These changes are specially required in the field of administrative, technical and finan­cial powers as well as extensive delegation of budgeting and re-appropriation procedures. The existing procedures and practices do not fulfill the requirement of the schemes. Unless these procedures are changed to meet the needs of centralization, the hurdles in the smooth functioning of the decentralized planning would remain.

One of the reasons why decentralized planning did not off the ground was that the budgetary and re-appropriation procedures had not been suitably modified.

A plan becomes an instrument of action only when financial provisions stipulated in it find a place in the budget and provisions, thus made, are also available for actual use.

There has to be a mechanism, therefore, to ensure that a District Plan, once finalized, is faithfully reflected in the budget and financial provisions made therein are made available to actual users without further loss of time. The existing procedure and practices do not fulfill the requirements.

The planning system in India is hardly geared to popular participation, which at concrete contents and political level should be the most important raison d’etre for lower-level planning.

It, however, gets lost in the ritual of the bureaucracy contacting ‘progressive farmers” which, due to the divorce between district planning and land reforms, leads to mechanical, bureaucratic and sec­tional responses.

There is hardly any involvement of social, economic or profes­sional organizations in either the elaboration or implementation of planning.

The logic of district planning as the instrument of state intervention for rural development, within the larger framework of multi-level development planning, is compelling. However, district planning as it is actually operating in India, leaves much to be desired.

One of the major problems of effective district planning is a stubborn per­sistence of departmental or sectoral planning rather than spatial planning where the district space becomes the unit.

This persistence of ‘departmentalism’ is actually built into the existing structure of administration where the spatial bound­aries of a district collector’s area of control, i.e., the departments operating in his district, overlaps with the sectoral boundaries of a secretariat department’s area of control, i.e., the units of the department functioning in each district.

Clearly, the elimination of this fundamental dysfunctionality between the requirements of district planning and the existing structure of administration would require a very bold attempt at reorganization from the state level downwards in an administra­tive system which has entrenched and consolidated itself over a long period going back to the colonial era.

As the planners at the district level are not told to make any specific as­sumptions regarding changes in the price level, the task of ensuring consistency between physical and financial target is defaulted.

The district planners do not plan an inter-related mix of instruments and policies equal to the task of imple­menting programmes of agricultural extension and development.

In view of the fact that such planning of plan implementation is not undertaken even at the national level planning, such an outcome is inevitable. Thus, the important in­strument of supply of critical agricultural inputs for realization of desired crop­ping pattern or yield target is not utilized in a planned manner.

Similarly meth­odology, for coordination with central, state and private sector projects located in the district, has not been built into district planning.