Get complete information on the civil-military relationships in various countries

The pattern of civil-military relations prevailing in India was created by the staff of Lord Mountbatten as a three-tier system extending from the prime minister to the three service chiefs. At the apex of this structure is the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet.

The second level is the Defence Minister’s Committee of the Cabinet, and the third level is the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Other committees, such as the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Defence Science Advisory Committee, and the Joint Planning Committee, assist the higher committees. There were proposals in the mid-1990s to establish joint defense staffs for better integration of inter service resources, programs, policies, and operations

In the immediate post independence period, the Defence Minister’s Committee of the Cabinet did not play an active role in policy formulation. The higher organization of defense was vested largely with the minister of defence. From 1957 to 1962, this position was held by V.K. Krishna Menon, whose authority far exceeded that usually accorded a minister of defence.

A confidante of Nehru’s through much of the late pre independence period, Menon functioned as Nehru’s alter ego for national security and defense planning. Consequently, the locus of decision making shifted from the cabinet to the Defence Minister’s Committee. Menon was in many ways responsible for laying the foundations of India’s military-industrial base.

Among other endeavors, Menon was responsible for the development of ordnance facilities to manufacture the Ichapore semiautomatic rifle; a tank manufacturing complex at Avadi, Tamil Nadu; facilities to build frigates at the Mazagon Dock naval shipyard in Bombay; and the licensed manufacture of Soviet-designed MIG-23 fighter aircraft in Nasik, Maharashtra.

However, his highly idiosyncratic manners, his high-handed ways, and his involvement in the tactical aspects of military decision making had negative consequences. For example, he quarreled with the professional military, particularly India’s third chief of army staff, General K.S. Thimayya, overThimayya’s attempt to warn Menon and Nehru about the emerging Chinese threat as early as 1959.

When Thimayya resigned in protest, Nehru prevailed upon him to withdraw his resignation. Unfortunately, when questioned in the Lok Sabha (House of the People), the lower house of the Parliament, about Thimayya’s resignation, Nehru offered a rather weak defense of the general’s actions and sought to deflect the criticisms of his minister of When Thimayya retired as chief of army staff in May 1961, Menon passed over Thimayya’s designated successor, Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat, and instead appointed a junior officer, Lieutenant General P.N. Thapar.

The appointment not only created a rift between the professional military and political leadership but also alienated a number of high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Defence. Menon’s actions also demoralized competent personnel in the civilian and military bureaucracies, which led to important gaps in defense preparedness and planning. Menon’s dominance of the defense planning process significantly contributed to the military debacle of 1962. The Indian defeat led to the establishment of a new Emergency Committee of the Cabinet.

This committee introduced a system of “morning meetings” with the minister of defence and the three service chiefs. The morning meetings, which are conducted without a predetermined agenda, deal with current defense issues on a regular basis. The meetings are also attended by the cabinet secretary, the defence secretary, and the scientific adviser to the minister of defence. These morning meetings continue to take place.

In the Chiefs of Staff Committee, formal equality prevails among the three service chiefs despite the fact that the army remains the largest of the three branches of the armed services. This formal equality among the three services came about with independence.

To facilitate defense planning, the government established two organizations: the Defence Coordination and Implementation Committee and the Defence Planning Staff. The Defense Coordination and Implementation Committee are chaired by the defence secretary and meets on an ad hoc basis. Its membership includes the three service chiefs, representatives from civilian and military intelligence organizations, and the secretary of defence production.

The Defence Planning Staff, a permanent body, was established in 1986. Composed of officers drawn from all three services, it is responsible for developing overall national security strategy. It is also charged with briefing the Chiefs of Staff Committee on long-term threats to national security.

Russia:

In Russia, the most important of all the successor states of the Soviet Union, the military preferred to stay away from assuming any role political role or running the day-to-day affairs of the state. It has been suggested by a noted scholar that the Russian military suffers from the ‘Tbilisi syndrome’, and hence, stays away from politics. At a place called Tbilisi in Russia, the Army was called in to perform internal security duties and act against civilians in the year 1989.

This laid earned great disrepute for the military and it was at the receiving end in the media campaign. Also, the military was asked to move in on two other occasions to perform internal security duties. However, on these occasions, too, the actions of the military were severely criticised. Therefore, the Russian military exhibits ‘great reluctance’ to assure any role in matters of internal security. Not only this, as much as the military is anchored in the society to which it belongs, political changes arid evolving orientations do get reflected in the military, too. ‘

This holds a serious threat to the professional character of the Armed Forces, as there is always the potential for the military splitting on political lines. Hence, if the military intervened in the internal politics of Russia, one scholar explains, it was because it was ordered to discharge internal security duties by the legitimate civilian leadership, which it did with great reluctance.

Nigeria:

According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the phrase “Civil- Military relations” encompasses all “activities undertaken by NATO commanders in war directly concerned with the relationship between allied armed forces and the government, civil population, or agencies of non-NATO countries where such armed forces are stationed, supported or employed”. In peacetime, A more functional definition is that suggested by Carolina Hernandez of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies in the Philippines. She describes it, quite simply, as “the balance of power between military and civilian branches of government”. I dare say, however, that the interplay of civil and military components of society extends beyond the bounds of the government.

Traditional civil-military relations presume civil supremacy and guidance, in other words, full democratic control of the military in its role and responsibility to society as the ultimate guarantor of national security.

This implies the military is a servant of society which exercises its monopoly over the most violent means of violence in the interest of its citizens in response to popular will and consent. To exercise this role, the military must have unique expertise within a corporate structure guided by a strong sense of ethical and moral responsibility.

Civil society on the other hand must have strong institutions through which the will and consent of the citizenry are projected.

On the other end of the spectrum is the situation in which a Military regime subordinates civil society and civilian branches of government. In between GullyBaba Publishing House both extremes, the military may act behind the scenes as the sponsor, guide, protector and supporter of a civilian government, and thus retain the ability to influence it in many areas within and outside the defence and security spheres.

In this situation the civilian government has no influence over military, defence and perhaps even foreign policy but maintains an appearance of control. Gradual subordination of the military involves a process of continuously chipping away at the military’s exclusive control over these areas of state activity, first by removing its influence over policy matters outside defence and security, and then limiting its influence or policy control to defence perse.

The final stage of subordination is said to have occurred when the civilian government has total control of all policy areas, including national defence. In this situation, however, the military still partakes in policy formulation and debate but ultimate decisions are made by the legitimate civilian government, presumably acting in trust as it exercises the will of larger society.

From the foregoing, it would seem that overt intervention in domestic politics by the conventional state organized and funded military is the worst kind of civil-military relationship. However, on the other end, defining the corporate role of the Armed Forces in formulating and implementing defence and foreign policy under supervision of constitutional authority, while simultaneously respecting the “space” of the military, remains a challenge to democratically elected governments. It should be recognized, though, that dysfunctional civil- military relations may be expressed in other ways, such as the misuse of the military for civilian directed repression and even genocide, emergence of child soldiers and ethnic militia warlords, illegal weapons proliferation, commercialization of security and other expressions of militarization. In Nigeria, whether civil society is supreme and has the capacity, will, responsibility, authority and power to guide the military is open to debate.

The country’s creation by British conquest, preceded as it was by the establishment of a brutal mercantile military machine, consolidated by a long line of colonial military figures has been followed by a post-independence record of repeated military interventions.

These forays into politics have often been justified by dubious rationalizations of the military as the ultimate (and thus unaccountable) constitutional guarantor and protector of national sovereignty – against all perceived enemies, foreign and domestic.

Along with many events that have legitimized violence as a tool for negotiation, it has helped impose a militaristic tradition in the country’s political mindset. At a subconscious level, force and deception, rather than “rule of law” may have become quasi-respectable as ways of doing business.

This life cycle has only been punctuated by brief civilian intermissions during which the military still maintained certain perks behind the scenes. Thus, given the national charter imposed by history and habit, one can be forgiven for sometimes wondering

Whether the question in modern Nigeria is military-civil rather than civil-military relations.

Following a naval bombardment on December 26 and 27, 1851, motivated by Britain’s desire for a share of regional trade, Lagos was brought under British gunboat influence.

But it was not until 1861, following a gradual erosion of the powers of the Oba, that Lagos formally became a colony and was the first part of what later became “Nigeria” to be incorporated into the British Empire, courtesy of an agreement signed under duress by Oba Dosunmu, Akitoye’s son. A constabulary force was later formed in 1863 to police the colony, protect British traders, and handle some raids into the hinterland.

It was also called “Glover’s Hausas”. This nickname originated from the fact that Lt. Glover of the Royal Navy whose exploration ship got wrecked near Jebba on the River Niger picked up a band of run away Hausa slaves and employed them as a security force as he made his way back to the coast over Yoruba land. This unit was the ancestor of what later became the 4th Battalion of the Nigerian Army at Ibadan during the first republic. All through the various battles of British conquest, former slaves, exiled criminals, other disenfranchised individuals and mercenaries formed the bulk of fighting troops, albeit commanded by British officers.

Iraq

The first unit of the Iraqi army was established on January 6, 1921 and was emblematically named Fawj Musa al-Kadhim, after the seventh Shi’i imam whose tomb is situated under the golden shrine in Baghdad This is perhaps the first paradox pertaining to this entity, which has been an army by the Sunnis and for the Sunnis.

To be sure, the number of Shi’i recruits increased in later decades, mainly because of the conscription, which was established by a law in 1934, drafting the Shia to the army in large numbers. But this increase in numbers did not cause an increase of Shi’ power, because the officer corps remained predominantly Sunni. This article surveys the historical military experience since the formation of modern Iraq and until the present time.

Prior to the British invasion 1914-1918, Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, along with many other Arab areas in the region. The Ottomans divided the historic land of Iraq into three separate provinces, Musol in the north, Baghdad in the center and Basra in the south. The country was underdeveloped and plagued by highly corrupt governments.

Following the declaration of WWI, the Ottoman central government issued its orders to all provinces to begin a sweeping campaign of monetary levy and to draft as many young men as Possible to support the war effort. This was a long-awaited opportunity for the local administrators to enrich themselves at the expense of the general population and all in the name of war expenditure.

Great Britain invaded Iraq for the purpose of securing its interests in the region’s oil and the protection of the route to India. The first British force landed at the Fao peninsula, southern Basra, on November 6, 1914-three days after the Ottoman Empire entered an alliance with Germany, and on the eve of the Ottoman declaration of war against Great Britain and France. On November 23, “Sir Percy Cox read in Arabic a proclamation which included the following statement of policy:

‘The British Government has now occupied Basra, but though a state of war with the Ottoman Government still prevails, yet we have no enmity or ill-will against the population, to whom we hope to prove good friends and protectors. No remnant of Turkish administration now remains in this region. In place thereof the British flag has been established, under which you will enjoy the benefits of liberty and justice, both in regard to your religious and secular affairs

The relatively easy occupation of Basra gave the British an arrogant sense of confidence which caused them to dispatch a weak campaign against the Ottoman army up the Tigris River without the proper support. On April 29, 1916 the entire British army participating in that campaign, commanded by General Townshend, surrendered to the Ottomans in Kut after a brutal siege for five months, beginning in early December 1915. There were 13,309 soldiers and officers, including 2,870 British soldiers and officers, while the rest were Indians However; British forces eventually accomplished the occupation of Iraq by 1918.

The reaction of Iraqis toward the British varied according to each group’s respective interests. The most favorable reaction came from the merchants, contractors and farm owners who made very handsome revenues from dealing with the British contrary to their dealings with the Ottomans.

The British paid generously for the goods and services, while the Ottomans used to confiscate and conscript. Another group also was amenable to British occupation consisted of opportunist notables whose loyalty is given to the victors regardless of who that might be. The British also managed to purchase the loyalty of several tribal chiefs who promised to deliver the consent of their constituents.

However, British efforts to secure the consent of religious authorities proved to be fruitless. British officials operated under the false assumption that centuries of Ottoman oppression were enough to make the Shi’i clergy ready to accept anyone who may deliver them from their ordeal.

To the contrary, Shi’i scholars in Najaf, Karbala and Baghdad sided with the Sunni Ottomans against the non- Muslim invaders-many of them, like Muhammad Said al-Habboubi, actively participated in the fighting and mobilization of resistance forces, while more senior scholars, including Mahdi al-Khalisi and Mahdi al-Haydari, used their religious credentials to call for a binding jihad against the invaders. Their effort reached its climax in 1920, with the countrywide popular revolt, causing the British more than four hundred lives combined with a heavy price tag of 40 million pounds.

The revolt was instrumental in changing Britain’s plans for Iraq, from annexation, in the way India was dealt with, to the creation of an independent state with the preservation of British interests in the region as the first priority. On June 6. 1920, Sir Percy Cox, who was the British ambassador in Tehran, was summoned to London to consult with his government concerning the establishment of a provisional administration in Iraq.

While en route to London, the 1920 revolt erupted and, by the time he arrived, British press and public opinion was mobilized against the involvement in Iraq, because of the loss in blood and treasure. The first order of business, according to Cox, was to suppress the revolt and then to either withdraw from Iraq and give up the mandate in order to cut the losses, or establish a local (Iraqi) government, which he favored

On October 1, 1920, Cox arrived in Basra with a mandate to create an Iraqi national government. He was received by many people and a party was organized the next day to honor him and bid the outgoing political administrator, Arnold T. Wilson farewell. Several political hopefuls gave soothing speeches praising the “noble efforts” of Great Britain and accused the revolutionaries of shortsightedness. Of these it is worth quoting the speech of Muzahim al- Pachachi at some length:

“I feel sorry that the foolishness of some Arab individuals disturbed the nation of Britain and its honorable mission (i.e. the occupation of Iraq). These acts were perpetrated because of some dreams impossible to come true, on the one hand, and for personal goals, on the other hands.

The current movement- he means the Revolution-is not pure Arab. It is rather contaminated by foreign elements that regrettably succeeded to use the Arab fame and money and blood for their own benefit, and in order to weaken the position of Great Britain in other countries.

Therefore, you must not be fooled by the appearances, which are deceptive most of the time-especially in the East. Don’t consider the present Revolution, which is carried out by some Bedouin tribes, a real patriotic revolution aiming for independence; for, such an uprising cannot be considered representative of the feeling of the whole population. Elite families in Baghdad can never sympathize with an uprising that destroyed its own country.

These are the true feelings of the people who have important opinions, and they are eager to relate what they think and feel to those who call for the withdrawal of Britain from this country. They cannot realize that the withdrawal means nothing less than the violation of the rule of law and the destruction of the population and the ensuing spread of chaos all over the country, which might lead to an Asian war before which Britain cannot stay idle.

Cox started his mission by appointing Ms. Gertrude Bell as his secretary-she was a well-educated civil employee who played an essential role in the creation of modern Iraq. He formed a cabinet with Abd al-Rahman al-Naqib as prime minister and twenty-one ministers. The nominee for prime minister insisted on a cabinet with no Shi’i ministers and eventually got his wish every minister was coupled with a British advisor who was the actual authority in the ministry’s day-to-day affairs.

The next task was to recruit a head of state for the new country. The new king had to meet two conditions, being accepted by the Iraqis and willing to serve the interests of Great Britain in the country. It became clear from the first days of the search that no Iraqi personality would gain the confidence of Ms. Bell and her superiors.

Some Iraqi officers who returned from abroad began a propaganda campaign for Faysal, the son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, with whom they served in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. The idea of installing Faysal on the Iraqi throne was also supported by British officials, especially Ms. Bell. Finally, the British set their mind on Faysal to be the king, but they ensured through their own Iraqi agents that Faysal was chosen by the Iraqis themselves, by pretending to be against the choice. The assumption was that Iraqis would always act in contrary to the wish of the British, as Ms. Bell correctly stated

Faysal had previously led an army from Hijaz to fight the Ottomans on behalf of Britain and France with the understanding that his father, Sharif Husayn of Mecca, would be rewarded with a kingdom in Arabia, Iraq and the Greater Syria. Feeling betrayed by his former allies, especially the British who declined to honor their pre-war agreement, without telling Faysal that they promised Syria to France, Faysal appointed himselfking of Syria in March 1920.

However, the San Remo Conference, held on April 19-26, assigned the mandate for Syria to France. It took the French a little effort to defeat Faysal’s army in the Battle of Maysalun and dismantle the rew kingdom in Damascus on July 24, 1920, five months after its establishment.Faysal lived in exile until he was contacted by the British to rule over Iraq.

Faysal was brought to Iraq on a British military boat in June 1921 and was Coronated on August 23rd in the same year, following a national referendum. The people of each province were asked to sign a document authorizing a delegation to go to Baghdad and give their allegiance (bay’a) to Faysal; he, carried all the provinces except Kirkuk, were he was accepted by twenty documents and was rejected by twenty-one.

The choice of the coronation date was made by Faysal himself, because it coincided with the 18 Dhu al- Hijja in the Islamic calendar when the Shi’a celebrates the Eid al-Ghadir; the day Prophet Muhammad appointed Ali for the caliphate. Once again the Shi’a got their share in symbolism and the Sunnis carried the substance. Faysal began his term in office by appointing a legion of former Ottoman officers who were serving him in his conquest of Syria during World War and in his short-lived kingship thereafter, all of whom were Sunnis.

These officers, known as the Sharifians, continued to assume both the military and civilian ranks throughout the monarchy. To ensure the triumph of Faysal and his officers, the British manipulated the elections, supported the deportation of the Shi’a Ayatollahs who opposed the political process, and worst of all, they established a minority rule in Iraq. The latter put to rest any hopes for establishing a free and democratic society in the country for the next eight decades.

When Faysal was coronated in 1921, Iraqi defense was the responsibility of Great Britain according to the mandate granted to it by the League of Nations at San Remo in the previous year. In spite of being selected by the top clergy and the Iraqi elite, the new king was not well connected to the population at large. Further, British continuous meddling in every detail undermined Faysal’s prospects for legitimacy.

A national army loyal to the monarchy was a way to enhance its legitimacy and ensure solidity among the diverse constituents of Iraq’s population. But this was easier to propose than to actually achieve. First, because the Ottoman officers were not a monolithic group. While some of them were monarchy loyalists (less than two hundred officers who joined Faysal in the Arab Revolt), the majority of returning officers espoused nationalist views and were offended by continued British occupation. Additionally, there were many officers who maintained the old loyalty to Turkey. Second, the recruitment effort did not meet the hopes of the government in spite of the propaganda and appeals by the king and his close associates to tribal shaykhs and religious scholars for cooperation.

One of the main reasons for the shortage in recruits was the low pay of soldiers as compared with other professions. But this problem was solved quickly when the British decided in 1922 to raise the pay for the military, encouraging young men from all groups to join the army.

Pakistan

Pakistan is an illustration of a country that has been under military rule for a larger part of its existence, and has once again slipped into the control of the armed forces in the year 1999. On October 12 that year, General Pervez Musharraf seized executive power in a bloodless coup dethroning the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharief, who imprisoned and later sent into exile in Saudi Arabia.

There were no demonstrations against the coup, nor was anger expressed. The people of Pakistan, ‘generally speaking’, were rather unmoved, if not pleased, that the reign of the incumbent Prime Minister came to an end. The Mushsraf regime lost no time in suspending the Constitution as Well as in securing the loyalty of the judiciary.

The sitting Judges of the highest Court of the land, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, were, within days after the coup, asked to once again swear an ‘oath of allegiance’ under the new military dispensation. Subsequently thereafter, they had granted legal sanction to the act of the coup per se and its continuance. The military administration, assured that it would restore democracy within three years from the date of the coup, that is, before October 2002.

According to one scholar, the 1999 coup is different from the earlier ones in that the regime had not taken to imposing martial law, unlike during the earlier instances when it usurped power in Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan was directly governed by the military between the years 1958-62, 1969-71, and 1977-85. And, it was indirectly ruled by the military between the years 1962-69, 1971 -72 and 1985-88.

The consequence of long spells of military has been that democratic tradition failed to gain ground. A Pakistani scholar notes, “Persistent military rule [in Pakistan] has undermined democratic values, norms and institutions that promote democracy, i.e. political parties’ autonomous groups, and a free and responsible press.

Each military intervention met the needs of particular interest groups at a given moment. [Resultantly], these particular interests spawned powerful groups within the government that threatened democratic norms and values, and violated the legal and constitutional procedures.” As a result of the domineering role that the military plays, and because of civilian political institutions being weak in Pakistan, elected civilian Prime Ministers neither had the ability nor the desire to bridle the military.

At least privately, the military made no secret of its ability and willingness to seize power if the Generals so desired. Consequent to the death in an air crash of military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, elections were held and a civilian government took office. The then army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, disclosed subsequently that restoring democracy was a gift that the Army bestowed upon the citizens of Pakistan, but the civilian leadership on a constant watch.

Importantly, the military plays a decisive role in the political affairs of the country when competing elements of the civilian leadership are not in a position to come to terms with one another. For instance, the then President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmad Leghari, and the Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, entered into tug with one another. Then, Leghari dismissed Benazir. But, subsequently he, too, had to go. Though the military did not publicly play any role, it is widely believed that it had acted from behind the scenes.

United States

One the oldest fears in civil military relations is militarism, the displacement of civilian government by the military and the imposition of military values, perspectives and ideals on the rest of society. This fear is rooted in the fear of standing armies and embedded in the US Constitution. The word militarism was invented by European leftist opponents of their government in the eighteen sixties. Militarism came to be seen in the United States as a threat to freedom and democracy.

The fear of militarism was articulated in academia and Congress in the nineteen thirties. In the United States, this fear was expressed primarily toward internal problems, but after World War I, it was also seen as having caused German aggression and thus as a force that created foreign threats.

In 1941, Harold Laswell wrote on the garrison state. Charles Beard, the historian, expressed similar fears about the dangers of centralized power in a Republic and its threat to civil liberties. These fears did not materialize however. American victory in World War II and the Cold War were achieved with heavy military spending but not a total capitulation to military values.

After the Cold War, around the world, democracy not only survived but expanded, along with individual liberty and human rights, and military budgets declined. Military regimes declined in number. War became more an internal than international problem.

Yet the global war on terror brings back the problem of militarization and the threat of militarism. Most people accept that this war is indefinite. It is a war against an ill-defined enemy, without a way to measure success or victory. It has already produced domestic stresses common to other American wars.

Moreover, because of the internal nature of the terrorist threat, the impact of the war on American society could well exceed those of previous conflicts. The danger today is not militarization.

The United States has already experienced a high degree of militarization. The danger is that further militarization will lead to militarism. The question is to what extent American values and institutions will become militaristic and change the character of the country into one our founders would abhor.

What is the difference between militarization and militarism? Militarization comes from the organization of the state for war. It is the degree to which societal institutions, values, and thoughts are shaped by war. Militarism is the rectification of military power as an end in itself.

Militarization emerged in Europe in the sixteenth century when monarchs organized their subjects for war. But it was only in late nineteenth century when armies professionalized, governments began to devote more wealth to arms, and militaries sought and gained more autonomy that militarization took off.

In the United States, because of the perception of success, by the nineties, the military had gained unprecedented influence. The military has had less influence since 2001, but that has been a choice by military leadership. Until the twentieth century, the United States lagged behind Europe in militarization. War and peace were very separate until the Cold War. Our country has a long history of periods of militarization for war-making and bluster and jingoism in war. But prior to World War II, the country built up a large arsenal and military only during war.

It was the World War I partnership between government and business to produce military power that changed things. The force dismantled after the war, but the idea remained. This was an irreversible step toward the creation of the national security state.

In the interwar period, the American armed forces began systematically to make war plans. The services reached out to business to plan for mobilization. With the Great Depression, the tools used to organize the war spilled over to other parts of the government. War metaphors were invoked to fight poverty. War became the central paradigm used to shape the organizations that fought the depression. The New Deal organizations were led largely by men who had run World War I organizations.

With World War II came full militarization. Industry converted to war ends, wage and price controls were instituted, and foreign and domestic policy were subordinated to the war effort. Universities, professional organizations, and even Hollywood contributed as they could. During the Cold War, militarization became less pervasive but more permanent. Internal security became a consuming concern. American foreign policy became a handmaiden of containment. For the first time, the United States constructed nearly permanent alliances. The strategic objectives of the Cold War displaced other economic and political aims to determine foreign relations. Military leadership became more influential in interagency politics.

The services gained independence and power. Veterans groups emerged to promote preparedness and other ends. Conventional forces were expanded and their readiness upgraded. The forces built bases abroad and send military advisors to dozens of countries. A huge intelligence apparatus grew, not only to ascertain enemy intentions but to combat them around the world.

America overturned foreign governments and made covert war. War language came to pervade daily life. America declared war on drugs and poverty. Military planning spread to business. Football, with its similarity to combat, displaced baseball as the national sport.

Despite all this, a lot of factors prevent the formation of command economy and a garrison state, as Aaron Friedberg argues. But even without a full garrison state, the vast expansion of the military and its penetration into society militarized many aspects of American life. Various industries became dependent on military spending for their existence.

The military became seen as an institution with models and tools to solve all problems. American trust in the federal government declined dramatically in the last thirty five years, but the military has risen to iconic status. Americans have trusted the military more than any other institution in government by a wide margin for twenty years.

China:

In China, a country guided by Marxist ideology, the Communist Party of China controls the affairs of the state. The military is at once a part of the ruling structures and yet under the firm control of the Party. The military and the Party were closely inter-linked, at least in the earlier years. Mao Tse Tung had drawn a clear line of distinction between the military and the Party and said ‘the Party must always control the military’, though he had also said that ‘political power grows out of the barrel of the gun’. Over a period of time, the military has acquired ‘professionalism’ and this had, on occasion, brought it into a conflicting role with the Party, though it is the Party that still controls the military. In other words, the military has not always remained totally subservient to the Party.

The military was often a member of the highest decision making structures in the country, like in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Iiowever, it should also be noted that in the year 1987 the military was not represented on the Standing Committee, for the reason that reforms initiated during that time – sought to draw a clear line of distinction between the Party, the government and the military. Having realized during the events that unfolded later-the 1989 demonstrations against the policies of the Party-that military did not evince expected levels of enthusiasm in performing internal security duties assigned to it, the military was, subsequently, in 1992, made a member of the Standing Committee. One analyst has observed that there is a greater interdependence between the Party and the military at the higher levels than at the lower levels of the hierarchy.

Whether the military would go on to acquire significant influence over the arty, meaning political power, is a matter of debate among several analysts. The debate commenced especially after the military was initially included in the economic modernization drive and was asked to take up tasks that would eventually contribute to the country’s treasury.

In 1998, the military was asked to cease all business operations as it had been found that it was increasingly getting out of civilian control. Not only this, among other things, there were also allegations of corruption and hoarding against the military, besides having provided the inspiration to the police forces and the judiciary, too, to undertake business activity. There is also the view that having taken-up business activity the military has, to an extent, suffered professionalism.

From these case studies, we see that there are three broad categories of civil- military relations.

First, from the Indian and the American example, we can identify a civil- military relationship in which the armed forces are depoliticized to a large extent and in which the military is entirely subservient instrument of the political incumbents of the day, irrespective of who they are or what their views are. Our case studies also bring out that this form of civil-military relationship need not preclude the military from exercising very considerable political influence, providing only that the civil authorities have the final say, Second, in countries like China and Iraq we have seemed that there exist a symbiotic relationship between the armed forces and the ruling party. This pattern

Military coup d’état has most become an alternative to elections as a means of changing governments.