What are the factors which encourage the military to take over power?

The most interesting aspect of theories on civilian-military relations is that while they may explain one situation or the other in which the model is operational, if not based on, it fails to explain many other nitty-gritty’s.

This is not to undermine the importance of theory but to highlight the dynamism of the issue, particularly in countries like Pakistan.

One of the first theories on military intervention in Asian societies, for example, by Samuel P. Huntington conceptualizes army as subservient to its master in a civilian-dominated democratic state. In what he calls ‘Praetorian” states the civilian institutions are weak.

A vacuum in the institution and leadership impels groups to strive for control for their own ends, and armed forces count among many potential contenders for power. Praetorian state, according to him, is the one in which there is politicization of social structures because of absence of political institutionalization.

This argument may explain why army in Pakistan intervened in 1958 but it does not explain why did a state which inherited essentially a Western model being ruled over by a political power for almost two centuries turned out to be essentially a military state.

The army which Pakistan inherited in 1958 was very different from the army in 1947. It was much more professional and organised than the army of 1947. On the contrary, whatever existed in the name of political structure in 1947 saw a decline, and eventually reached a state where military takeover seemed to be the only solution.

This proved yet another assertion by Huntington that rise of military professionalism is inversely related to military intervention, that is, the modem professional sense of mission military mindedness and corporate economy incline the military against political intervention.

Then there are scholars like Lucian Pye and Morris Janowitz et al who portray the military as being more sensitive to forces of social and political change. Showing military intervention as a result of positive qualities of military, the military is seen as an instrument of modernisation by virtue of its positive qualities as an organised force. What makes Pakistan, a case apart is the repeated military intervention with interregnum of civilian rules. The legitimacy of civilian supremacy, in theory, remains.

This is evident from the fact that all the generals-from Ayub to Musharraf-initially after capturing power promised to return to civilian order as soon as possible. The latest is from General Musharraf who has launched a massive devolution plan giving impression of setting up a grass root participatory democracy.

That this declaration doesn’t mean much is evident by the fact that General Zia, who had promised elections in 90 days, did actually hold what can at best be called sham of elections in the name of “Party less elections” only towards the end of his tenure. Yet another lesser-known aspect of Pakistan’s civil-military relations is their nature in the civilian regimes. In other words, what has been highlighted, is repeated military interventions at the end of chaotic civilian orders. The fact that whenever the civilian rulers came to power they have taken measures to keep the army in check has not been talked about much.

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the supremacy of the Prime Minister in a normal civilian order is an accepted fact. The counterpoint here is that the army in Pakistan needs to be looked at differently because apart from being the guards in the external security of the nation, the army in Pakistan is now a well-accepted political institution.