The Sahkhya theory of knowledge follows in the main its dualistic metaphysics. It accepts only three independent sources of valid knowledge (pramana). These are perception, inference and scriptural testimony (sabda).

The other sources of knowledge, like comparison, postulation (arthapatti) and non-cognition (anupalabdhi), are included under these three, and not recognised as separate sources of knowledge.

Valid knowledge (prama) is a definite and an unerring cognition of some object (arthaparicchitti) through the Modification of buddhi or the intellect which reflects the consiousness of the self in it.

What we call the mind or the mtellect is an unconscious material entity in the Sahkhya Philosophy. Consciousness or intelligence (chaitanya) really belongs to the self. But the self cannot immediately apprehend the objects of the world.

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If it could, we should always know all objects, since the self in us is not finite and limited, but all- pervading. The self knows objects through the intellect, the manas, and the senses.

We have a true knowledge of objects when, through the activity of the senses and the manas, their forms are impressed on the intellect which, in its turn, reflects the light or consciousness of the self.

In all valid knowledge there are three factors, namely, the subject (pramata), the object (pramey), and the ground or source of knowledge (pramana).

The subject being a conscious principle is no other than the self as pure consciousness (suddha cetana). The modification (vrtti) of the intellect, through which the self knows an object, is called pramana.

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The object presented to the self through this modification is the prameya. Prama or valid knowledge is the reflection of the self in the intellect as modified into the form of the object, because without the self’s consciousness the unconscious intellect cannot cognise anything.

Perception is the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense. When an object like the table comes within the range of your vision, there is contact between the table and your eyes.

The table produces certain impressions or modifications in the sense organ, which are analysed and synthesised by manas or the mind.

Through the activity of the senses and the mind, budhi or the intellect becomes modified and transformed into the shape of the table.

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The intellect, however, being an unconsious material principle, cannot by itself know the object, although the form of the object is present in it.

But as the intellect has an excess of sattva, it reflects, like transparent mirror, the consciousness of the self (purusa).

With the reflection of the self s consciousness in it, the unconscious modification of the intellect into the form of the table becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other thing.

So the material principle of buddhi, being transparent and bright (sattvika), reflects the consciousness of the self and illuminates or cognises the objects of knowledge.

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It is to be observed here that the reflection theory of knowledge has been explained in two different ways by Vacaspati Misra and Vijnanabhiksu. We have followed the former in the account of the knowledge process given above.

Vacaspati thinks that the knowledge of an object takes place when there is reflection of the self in the intellect which has been modified into the form of the object.

According to Vijnanabhiksu, the process of perceptual knowledge is like this: when any object comes in contact with its special sense organ, the intellect becomes modified into the form of the object.

Then, because of the predominance of sattva in it, the intellect reflects the conscious self and seems to be conscious, in the same way in which a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and becomes itself luminous and capable of manifesting other objects.

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But next, the intellect, which is thus modified into the form of the object, is reflected back in the self. That is, the object is presented to the self through a mental modification corresponding to the form of the object.

Thus on Vacaspati’s view, there is a reflection of the self in the intellect, but no reflection of the intellect back into the self. Vijnanabhiksu, on the other hand, thinks that there is a reciprocal reflection of the self in the intellect and of the intellect in the self.

This view is accepted also in Vedavyasa’s commentary on the Yoga- Sutra. What induces Vijnanabhiksu to suppose that the modified intellect is reflected in the self is perhaps the necessity of explaining the self s experience of pleasure and pain.

The self, being pure consciousness, free from all pleasure and pain, cannot be subjected to these experiences.

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It is the intellect which really enjoys pleasure and suffers pain. So, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self should be explained by some sort of reflection of the intellect in the self.

There are two kinds of perception, namely, nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate.

The first arises at the first moment of contact between a sense and its object, and is antecedent to all mental analysis and synthesis of the sense-data.

It is accordingly called alocana or a mere sensing of the object. In it there is cognition of the object as a mere something without any recognition of it as this or that kind of thing. It is an unverbalised experience like those of the infant and the dumb.

Just as babies and dumb persons cannot express their experience in words, so we cannot communicate this indeterminate perception of objects to other people by means of words and sentences.

The second kind of perception is the result of the analysis, synthesis and interpretation of sense-data by manas or the mind. So it is called vivecana or a judgment of the object.

It is the determinate cognition of an object as a particular kind of thing having certain qualities and standing in certain relations to other things.

The determinate perception of an object is expressed in the form of a subject-predicate proposition, e.g. ‘this is a cow,’ ‘that rose is red.’

Inference is the knowledge of one term of a relation, which is not perceived, through the other which is perceived and known to be invariably related to the first.

In it what is perceived leads us on to the knowledge of what is unperceived through the knowledge of a universal relation (vyapti) between the two. We get the knowledge of vyapti between two things from the repeated observation of their concomitance.

One single instance of their relation is not, as some logicians wrongly think, sufficient to establish the knowledge of a universal relation between them.

With regard to the classification of inference, the Sahkhya adopts the Nyaya view, although in a slightly different form. Inference is first divided into two kinds, namely, vita and avita.

It is called vita or affirmative when it is based on a universal affirmative proposition, and avlta or negative when based on a universal negative proposition. The vita is subdivided into the purvavat and the samanyatodrsta.

A purvavat inference is that which is bassed on the observed uniformity of concomitance between two things. This is illustrated when one infers the existence of fire from smoke because one has observed that smoke is always accompanied by fire.

Samanyatodrsta inference, on the other hand, is not based on any observation of the concomitance between the middle and the major term, but on the similarity of the middle with such facts as are uniformly related to the major.

How do we kn’ow that we have the visual and other senses? It cannot be by means of perception. The senses are supersensible. We have no sense to perceive our senses with.

Therefore, we are to know the existence of the senses by an inference like this: ‘All actions require some means or instruments, e.g. the act of cutting.

The perceptions of colour, etc.are so many acts; therefore, there must be some means or organs of perception.’

It should be noted here that we infer the existence of organs from acts of perception, not because we have observed the organs to be invariably related to perceptive acts, but because we know that perception is an action and that an action requires a means of action.

The other kind of inference, namely, avlta is what some Naiyayikas call sesavat or parisesa inference. It consists in proving something to be true by the elimination of an other alternatives to it.

This is illustrated when one argues that sound must be a quality because it cannot be a substance or an activity or a relation or anything else.

As regards the logical form of inference, the Sahkhyas admit, like the Naiyayikas, that the f^e-membered syllogism is the most convincing form of inferential Proof.

The third pramana is sabda or testimony. It is constituted by authoritative statements (aptavacana), and gives the knowledge of objects which cannot be known by perception and inference.

A statement is a sentence made up of words arranged in a certain way. A word is a sign which denotes something (vacaka), and its meaning (artha) is the thing denoted by it (vacya). That is, a word is a symbol which stands for some object.

The understanding of a sentence requires the understanding of the meanings of its constituent words. Sabda is generally said to be of two kinds, namely, laukika and vaidika. The first is the testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons.

This, however, is not recognized in the Sankhya as a separate pramana, since it depends on perception and inference. It is the testimony of Sruti or the Vedas that is to be admitted as the third independent pramana.

The Vedas give us true knowledge about super-sensuous realities which cannot be known through perception and inference. As not made by any person, the Vedas are free from all defects and imperfections that must cling to the works of personal agencies.

They are, therefore, infallible, and possess self-evident validity. The Vedas embody the intuitions of enlightened seers (rsis). These intuitions being universal and eternal, experiences are not dependent on the will or consciousness of individual persons.

As such the Vedas are impersonal (apauruseya). Yet they are not eternal since they arise out of the spiritual experiences of seers and saints, and are conserved by a continuous line of instruction from generation to generation.