Essay on the Administration of Portuguese Control on the Indian Ocean

The Portuguese administrative set up at first sight appeared centralized with the king at its head in Portugal (Madrid, after 1580), assisted by his officials. As however, instructions issued in Portugal were received after at least five months, the kings and their officials laid down the policy only in general terms. It was left to the authorities and local officials in Goa to carry out the day-to day work.

A viceroy or governor, initially functioning from Cochin and after 1515 usually from Goa was the head of the Estado do India or the Portuguese state of India.

The governor was slightly lower in status than the viceroy, but their work and responsibilities were nearly equal. At first there was a loosely constituted council to assist the governor in his work.

Around 1563, the councils were more regularized and were called the council of state.

Religious matters were handled by the clerics independent of the civil authority. Also, there was a municipal council formed of elected Portuguese and Eurasian members, who at times had consid­erable influence over the government.

The state administration in Goa was a macro­cosm or a larger replica of that in other areas and forts. There was a captain in each who was helped by a vedor da fazenda.

In addition, there was the factor, who conducted the royal business and the usual retinue of minor officials such as clerks. The clergy and a judge were also there and in larger areas, a municipal council usually looked after civic matters.

Anyway, the main object of all those forts and their captains was to help the Portuguese achieve several economic aims. These were:

1. a monopoly over the spice trade to Europe;

2. a monopoly over the trade between certain specified ports in Asia;

3. the control, direction and taxation of all other trade in the Indian Ocean; and

4. control over private trade, in which all the Portuguese residents in Asia were engaged.

The basic reason behind all those economic objectives was that it was impossible for a poor and distant country like Portugal to have a decisive impact on Asian land areas. Nor was it possible to maintain an empire as a matter of prestige.

The empire had to look after itself and the only way that could be done was by taxing sea trade, an area where the Portuguese were in a superior position due to their navy.

This becomes evident having regard to the fact that in the sixteenth century customs duties constituted 60 per cent of the entire revenue income of Goa, while for the whole empire it was close to 65 per cent.

With regard to the spice trade, a total monopoly over it was the Portuguese aim as soon they got to India. A number of decrees and instructions from Portugal were issued during the sixteenth century and later stipulating that all trade in spices was reserved entirely for the Portuguese crown and its agents.

The purpose of those decrees was to cur¹ the most profitable trade of the Muslims in India, Egypt and the Red Sea and to enable the Portuguese to buy cheap in Asia and sell dear to Europe.

Those who violated this policy were dealt with very severely. While a Portuguese offender was deprived of his salaries and properties, the Muslim faced imprisonment and confiscation of all his goods as well as the ship in which the forbidden article was found. In actual practice Muslim offenders were usually killed at once.

In rare instances, a closely controlled trade within Asia was permitted and subservient rulers were kept happy by permitting them to trade in pepper in limited quantities. The crews of ships returning to Portugal were allowed to take small quantities of spices with them as part of their salary.

As regards the second objective, i.e., monopoly over the trade between certain specified ports in Asia, M.N. Pearson says: “(It)…consisted of voyage to specified places within Asia on a monopolists basis; only the designated ship could make a give” voyage in a particular year. Cargo space on such ships thus sold at a premium.

In the earlier sixteen century voyages of this kind were done in royal ships, though a large part of the goods carried belonged to private merchants.

Later it was decided that such a method meant that the king had t much of his own capital tied up in ships a incidental expenses, so from 1540 at least individual were licensed to undertake these voyages. Such licences, like appointment to official positions, we given out on several grounds.”

The third objective was an attempt to con’ and tax whoever was engaged in trade in the Indian Ocean. It was in this so called cartaz-armada-cu system that the Portuguese had their greatest imp on the Asian trade. It was a kind of passport permit enforced by armada of warships, a concept entirely new to Asian merchants, but legally enforceable to the Portuguese (or so they believed).

Thus, all ships trading within Asia were legally bound to carry a permit issued by the Portuguese which stated who was the captain of the ship, h big it was and who were the crews aboard. The was restriction on quantities of arms and ammunitions carried.

Before setting out on a voyage, the was required to call at a Portuguese fort to customs duties and to deposit a certain amount a surety that it would call on return voyage to pay more customs duties. The ship was not to carry spices and enemies of the Portuguese state.

Ships without the cartaz were confiscated then and there, on the spot and their crews were killed immediately without further ado. In rare instances, they were imprisoned and sent to work as galley- slaves.

However, the fee for the cartaz was quite small; the Portuguese earned their high profits from the customs duties. Subsequently, in the sixteenth cen­tury another method for trade control was put into operation.

It was called the cafila, a convoy of local small trading ships guarded by a Portuguese fleet. The purpose of the system was to increase security, because if the ships were sunk by the pirates, the Portuguese revenue income would also go down.

Every year from Goa two or three cafilas would sail for the ports of Gujarat in the north, each cafila consisting of 200 or more ships.

Like car lazes, the cafilas also supposedly served two purposes: they protected the traders and pro­vided money to the Portuguese customs houses.