Phases in the history of panchayati raj in India and the associated committees

Balwantrai Mehta Committee and the phase of ascendancy (1959-64); phase of stagnation (19 69); phase of decline (1969-77); Ashoka Mehta Committee and the revival of panchayats but as political institutions in a few states

» Elections to local governments frequently postponed at the discretion of the state governments, or in many cases because of writ petitions to the courts

» Over the years, rural development in the Indian context came to be characterized by a proliferation (government schemes and programmes, staffed by civil servants who, at lower levels, were, at be accountable only to their superiors in the administrative hierarchy of their respective agencies or line departments, and at upper levels, motivated largely by career concerns in which the responsive to state-level elected representatives figured prominently.

» Under the planning approach, preoccupation with narrow sect orally-specific physical targets, If attention to integrated outcomes

» Inefficiencies, leakage, corruption associated with the plethora of government schemes;

» Increasing flow of funds through panchayats in their role as implementing agencies for various scheme led to emergence of collusive networks connecting bureaucrats, local and higher-level elect’ representatives, and other members of dominant local elites.

» Undermined the legitimacy of the panchayats and wreaked havoc on the the performance of various schemes.

» In 1991, under the pressure of a severe balance of payments crisis, and through a congruence d favorable political factors, the government then in power initiated a broad package of economy policy reforms, which subsequent governments have, for the most part, maintained and supplement Under the new economic policy regime, India’s notorious industrial licensing regime has been largely dismantled, domestic industry has been deregulated, trade liberalization measures have be implemented, and the economy has been opened up to foreign direct investment. Financial se reforms have also been introduced at a slow but steady pace.

» The timing of 1991 trade and industrial policy reforms happens to roughly coincide with the ate to revitalize local government, but in terms of the initial impulse as well as the ultimate aim, the’ reforms are quite distinct trade and industrial policy reforms precipitated by balance of crisis and the poor performance in terms of economic growth. Aim was to reduce sphere of government influence and control.

Consensus behind the need for local government reforms emerged mo gradually, and was borne out of the failures of the Indian developmental state in terms of hum” development and poverty alleviation, particularly in rural areas. The aim was to reconfigure the structure of government.

The constitutional amendment mandated the creation of a uniform three-tier structure of loc government institutions at the sub-state level. Immediately below the state are the district panchayat below them, the block panchayats, and at the lowest level, the gram panchayats (village councils). Gram panchayats have existed in most states since at least the late 1950s (following the recommendation of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee). However, in some states, there were no block panchayats (worthier equivalent) or district panchayats and in these states, these higher tiers of sub-state local government’ had to be created.

The relevant states all enacted the necessary legislation to meet this requirement, From a single national parliament and 25 state legislative assemblies, India went to having 238 , 682 additional constitutionally recognized representative bodies, 499 at the district level, 5905 at the bio level, and 232,278 at the village level. And for the first time there exists an uniform three-tier structure of rural local governments in India. In particular, village panchayats in Kerala and West Bengal stand out in being considerably larger in terms of population than village panchayats in other states.

Before 1994, the elected representatives effectively closest to the voters were the state legislative assembly members (MLAs). On average, this meant a population of nearly 200,000 or more per MLA. After 1994, this number has, in principle, come down to a few hundred in most states with the village panchayat representative being closest to the population. Prior to 1994, with the exception of West Bengal since 1978, local body elections had not been held on a regular schedule in most states. In many cases, elections were delayed as a result of writ petitions submitted to the courts by groups other than the state government. In others, state governments themselves unilaterally postponed elections, putting forward a variety of reasons for the postponement, from natural disasters to civil unrest to school holidays.

By mandating regular elections to local government institutions, the constitutional amendment sought to restrict the discretionary authority of the state governments. The amendment even contains a provision (Article 2430) barring interference by the courts in electoral matters.

Regular elections may ensure some degree of accountability and provide some legitimacy to locally elected representatives, but they represent only one step in the process of political devolution. Equally important is the degree of political autonomy afforded to locally elected bodies. On this front, there’s little variation across the states.

Reviews of the various state conformity acts indicate that even at the statutory level-let alone in terms of actual practice-state governments have, against the spirit of the amendment, retained considerable powers over the rural local bodies. In all states, the state-level legislation vests various functionaries of the state government-for instance, the district collector (the chief civil servant at the district level)-with the authority to intervene in the functioning of rural local bodies.

These provisions have been criticized by many proponents of local government, not because they do not recognize the need to have some accountability and oversight mechanisms in place, but because the provisions violate the separation of powers and such authority is better retained by the courts.

Lastly, by explicitly recognizing the gram sabha-the electorate of a village panchayat-the constitutional amendment envisioned a more direct channel through which citizens could exercise “voice” and participate in local governance.

The hope was that the gram sabha, through regular meetings over the course of the year, could become the fulcrum of the community development process, playing a key role in both the planning and subsequent monitoring of development activities. The particular roles and functions entrusted to the gram sabha were however left to the discretion of state legislatures.

The state-level legislation, in most states, does little more than mechanically list a variety of nominal functions and duties to be performed by gram sabhas. Only in Kerala, has there been an effort to seriously engage the gram sabha.