What fundamental shifts do we notice in Sino-Indian relations in quite recent times?

Sino-Indian relations also called Indo-China relations refer to international relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India. The economic and diplomatic importance of China and India, which are the two most populous states and the world’s fastest growing major economies, has in recent years increased the significance of their bilateral relationship.

Relations between China and India date back to ancient times. China and India are two of the world’s oldest civilizations and have coexisted in peace for millennia. Trade relations via the Silk Road acted as economic contact between the two regions. However, since the early 1950s, their relationship has been characterized by border disputes resulting in military conflict (the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Chola incident in 1967 and the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish).

Both countries have in recent years successfully attempted to reignite diplomatic and economic ties, and consequently, the two countries’ relations have become closer. Today, China is India’s largest trading partner, and has recently reverted its stance on India’s bid for a UNSC seat, after Chinese assistant Foreign Minister Kong Quan formally declare that China will back India’s UNSC bid. Today, India is a main seller of Iron ore to China, and fills the desperate need to natural resources for the nation.

Today, China and India both have close economic and military ties. In 2005, China and India announced a “strategic partnership”. China and India continue to strengthen their relations. Trade between China and India continues to grow. Many have agreed that Sino-Indian relations have entered maturity period.

Border disputes resulted in a short border war between the People’s Republic of China and India in 20 October 1962. The PRC pushed the unprepared and inadequately led Indian forces to within forty- eight kilometres of the Assam (now Asom) plains in the northeast and occupied strategic points in Ladakh, until the PRC declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November and withdrew twenty kilometers behind its contended line of control.

At the time of Sino-Indian border conflict, a severe political split was taking place in the Communist Party of India. One section was accused by the Indian government as being pro-PRC, and a large number of political leaders were jailed. Subsequently, CPI split with the leftist section forming the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1964. CPI(M) held some contacts with the Communist Party of Chin.” in the initial period after the split, but did not fully embrace the political line of Mao Zedong.

Relations between the PRC and India deteriorated during the rest of the 1960s and the early 1970s as Sino-Pakistani relations improved and Sino-Soviet relations worsened. The PRC backed Pakistan in its 1965 war with India. Between 1967 and 1971, an all-weather road was built across territory claimed by India, linking PRC’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan; India could do no more than protest.

The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign against India and supplied ideological, financial, and other assistance to dissident groups, especially to tribes in northeastern India. The PRC accused India of assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Diplomatic contact between the two governments was minimal although not formally severed.

The flow of cultural and other exchanges that hsul marked the 1950s ceased entirely. The flourishing wool, fur and spice trade between Lhasa and India throught the Nathula Pass, and offshoot of the ancient Silk Road in the then Indian protectorate of Sfkkim was also severed. However, the biweekly postal network through this pass was kept alive, which exists till today.

With Indian President K. R. Narayanan’s visit to China, 2000 marked a gradual re-engagement of Indian and Chinese diplomacy. In a major embarrassment for China, the 17th Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorje, who was proclaimed by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim. Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest to India on the issue would mean and explicit endorsement on India’s governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn’t recognised.

In 2002, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji reciprocated by visiting India, with a focus on economic issues. 2003 ushered in a marked improvement in Sino-Indian relations following Indian Prime Minsiter Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s landmark June 2003 visit to China. China officially recognized Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two nations moved toward resolving their border disputes.

2004 also witnessed a gradual improvement in the international area when the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and Jelepla Passes in Sikkim which would be mutually beneficial to both countries. 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade, surpassing the $10 billion mark for the first time. In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited in Bangalore (now Bengaluru) to push for increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries. In a speech, Wen stated “Cooperation is just like two pagodas (temples), one hardware and one software.

Combined, we can take the leadership position in the world.” Wen stated that the 21st century will be “the Asian century of the IT industry.” The high- level visit was also expected to produce several agreements to deepen political, cultural and economic ties between the two nations.

Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, on his visit, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support the idea, but had returned to a neutral position on the subejct by the time he returned to China. In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit (2005) China was granted an observer status. While other countries in the region are ready to consider China for permanent membership in the SAARC, India seems reluctant.

A very important dimension of evolving Sino-Indian relationship is based on the energy requirements of their industrial expansion and their readiness to proactively secure them by investing in the oilfields road-in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. On the one hand, these ventures entail competition which has been evident in oil biddings for various international projects recently).

But on the other hand, |degree of cooperation too is visible, as they increasingly confronting bigger players in the global oil ket. This cooperation was sealed in Beijing on January 12, 2006 during the visit of Petroleum and tural Gas Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar, who signed an agreement which envisages ONGC Videsh Ltd OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing joint bids for promising projects where. This may have important consequences for their inernational relations.

On July 6, 2006, China and India re-opened Nathula, and ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road. Nathula is a pass through the Himalayas and it was closed 44 years prior to 2006 when the ino-Indian War broke out in 1962.

The initial agreement for the re-opening of the trade route was reached in 2003, and a final agreement was formalized on June 18, 2006. Officials say that the re-opening of border de will help ease the economic isolation of the region. In Novemeber 2006, China and India had a BAL spat over claim of the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

India claimed that China was upying 38,000 square kilometers of its territory in Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of nachal Pradesh as its own. In May 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in ‘Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country.

Later in December 2007, China appeared to have reversed its policy by granting a visa to Marpe Sora, an Arunachal born professor in computer science. In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China and met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and had bilateral discussions related to trade, commerce, defense, military and various other issues.

Until 2008 the British Government’s position remained the same as had been since the Shimla Accord of 1913: that China held suzerainty over Tibet but not sovereignty. Britain revised this view on 29 “tober 2008, when it recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet by issuing a statement on its website.

The Economist stated that although the British Foreign Office’s website does not use the work sovereignty, Icials at the Foreign Office said “it means that, as far as Britain is concerned, ‘Tibet is part of China. Full stop’. ‘This change in Britain’s position affects India’s claim to its North Eastern territories which rely on the same Shimla Accord that Britain’s prior position on Tibet’s sovereignty was based upon.”

In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledging Arunachal Pradesh as part of India approved a loan to India for a development project there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the loan, however India succeeded in securing the loan with the help of the United States and Japan. China expressed displeasure at ADB for the same.