The domino theory was a theory during the 1950s to 1980s, promoted at times by the government of the United States that speculated that if one land in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow in a domino effect.

The domino effect suggests that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a falling row of dominoes standing on end. The domino theory was used by successive United States administrations during the Cold War to clarify the need for American intervention around the world.

The primary evidence for the domino theory is the communist takeover of three Southeast Asian countries in 1975, following the United States pulling its troops out of the region at the end of the Vietnam War: South Vietnam (by the Viet Cong), Loas (by the Pathet Lao), and Cambodia (by the Khmer Rouge). It can further be argued that the U.S. entry into war in Vietnam stalled the prior 1950s domino impact if Southeast Asia until the end of the war.

Note the Malayan Emergency, the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines, and the increasing involvement with Communists by Sukarno of Indonesia from the late 1950s until he was deposed in 1965. All of these were unsuccessful Communist attempts to take over Southeast Asian countries which stalled as U.S. military involvement in Vietnam ramped up.

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Walt Rostow and Lee Kuan Yew have argued that the U.S. intervention in Indochina, by given the nations of ASEAN time to consolidate and engage in economic growth, prevented a wider domino effect. Mc George Bundy argues that the prospects for a domino effect, though high in the 1950s and early 1960s, were weakened in 1965 when the Indonesian communist party was destroyed. However, proponents ultimately believe that the efforts during the containment (i.e. Domino Theory) period, ultimately led the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.